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Peter L. Markowitz* 
 
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court emphatically declared that deportation 
proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature.  As a result, none of the nearly 400,000 
individuals who were deported last year enjoyed any of the constitutional protections afforded to 
criminal defendants under the Sixth or Eighth Amendments.  Among those 400,000 were 
numerous detained juveniles and mentally ill individuals who, as a result of the civil designation, 
were forced to navigate the labyrinth of immigration law alone, without appointed counsel. Others 
were lawful permanent residents who had pled guilty to minor offenses upon the correct advice of 
counsel that they could not be deported—only to have Congress, unbound by the criminal 
prohibition against ex post facto laws, retroactively changed the law and subject them to 
deportation.  The dichotomy between the gravity of the liberty interest at stake in these 
proceedings—a lifetime of exile from homes and families in the United States—and the relative 
dearth of procedural protections afforded respondents, has always been intuitively unjust to many.  
However, over the past twenty years, as immigration and criminal law have become intertwined as 
never before, the intuitive sense of many has matured into a scholarly movement exploring the 
criminalization of immigration law.  This movement has taken aim at the incoherence of 
deportation’s civil designation.   
Until recently, there was little reason to think the Supreme Court would wade into the waters of the 
resurgent debate over the nature of deportation proceedings. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 
1473 (2010), however, the Court surprised almost everyone as it went to great length to chronicle 
the criminalization of immigration law and ultimately concluded that deportation is “uniquely 
difficult to classify.”  The immediate impact of the Padilla decision is the critical recognition that 
criminal defendants have a right to be advised by their attorneys if a plea they are contemplating 
will result in deportation.  However, I argue, that in time Padilla may come to stand for 
something much more significant in immigration jurisprudence. When we read Padilla in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s evolving immigration jurisprudence, there is good reason to believe 
that it is a critical pivot point for the Court.  Padilla marks the beginning of a significant 
reconceptualization of the nature of deportation toward the realization that it is neither truly civil 
nor criminal.  Rather, deportation is different.  It is a unique legal animal that lives in the crease 
between the civil and criminal labels.  This Article explores the evolving arch of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding the quasi-criminal nature of deportation proceedings and articulates a 
principled mechanism to define the scope of the rights afforded to individuals facing deportation 
under this new framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the Supreme Court famously declared that “death 
is . . . different”1—signaling that death penalty prosecutions stand 
alone as a unique category of adjudications that require a set of rules 
 
 1 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977) (“[Death] is different in both its severity 
and its finality.”). 
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all their own.  In 2010, the Supreme Court took a significant step to-
ward, once again, carving out a class of adjudications that defy com-
mon categorization, as it endorsed the argument that “deportation is 
different.”2  The Court’s holding in Padilla v. Kentucky marked a re-
markable3 and sensible expansion of an individual’s right to be ad-
vised by her criminal defense attorneys if she is contemplating a plea 
that could subject her to deportation.4  However, the impact of this 
narrow holding could, in time, pale in comparison to Padilla’s impact 
on our conception of deportation.  I argue in this article that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Padilla decision, commentators have 
failed to appreciate the way the decision appears to signal the begin-
ning of a dramatic pivot away from precedent regarding the “purely 
civil”5 nature of deportation proceedings.  While the Padilla Court 
continued to give lip service to its prior jurisprudence declaring de-
portation “civil,” it qualified this categorization as “nevertheless inti-
mately related to the criminal process” and ultimately concluded de-
portation is “uniquely difficult to classify.”6  What emerges from this 
discussion is the realization that deportation does not fit neatly into 
the civil or criminal box, but rather that it lives in the netherworld in 
between.  This modern, more refined, and, ultimately, more persua-
sive understanding of deportation will both allow courts to reconcile 
previously incoherent doctrine and plot a course for the more robust 
judicial protection of the rights of immigrants facing deportation. 
It is difficult to understate the import of the civil or criminal label 
for immigrants facing deportation.  The stakes in deportation pro-
ceedings are grave.  Lawful immigrants can face life sentences of ba-
nishment from their homes, families, and livelihoods in the United 
States and can potentially be sent to countries they have not visited 
since childhood, where they:  have no family, do not speak the lan-
 
 2 Brief of Petitioner at 54, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 
WL 1497552; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–82 (2010) (“Deportation 
as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the crimi-
nal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”). 
 3 The decision was remarkable because it adopted the position of a few outlier courts 
against the great weight of authority holding that defense counsel had no affirmative duty 
to advise client of the immigration consequences of contemplated dispositions.  See infra 
notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
 4 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486–87. 
 5 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (emphasizing the civil designation of removal proceedings); Li Sing 
v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (same); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698 (1893) (same). 
 6 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82. 
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guage, and can face serious persecution or death.7  Notwithstanding 
the gravity of the liberty deprivation at issue, as a result of the civil la-
bel currently applied to deportation proceedings, poor immigrants 
have no right to appointed counsel (despite the notorious complexity 
of immigration law);8 immigrants have no protection against retroac-
tive changes in the law (they can plead guilty to minor offenses based 
upon the correct advice of counsel that they will not be deported and 
the next day Congress can change the rules);9 immigrants have no 
right to have their proceedings in any particular venue (instead the 
government can whisk immigrants away into detention thousands of 
miles away from their home where they lack access to the counsel, 
evidence, and witnesses they need to prevail in their removal pro-
ceeding);10 and immigrants can be deported for the most minor of-
fenses, such as turnstile jumping or shoplifting candy (without any 
constitutional limit on the disproportionate punishment).11  The 
 
 7 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (“[D]eportation may result in the loss of 
all that makes life worth living.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ng Fung Ho 
v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“[Deportation] may result result also in loss of both 
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling 
the Civil-Criminal Divide:  A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration 
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 295, 338, 346 (2008) (discussing the 
serious deprivation of liberty that accompanies deportation). 
 8 See discussion infra Part I.C; see also Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (describ-
ing removal proceedings as a “labyrinthine character of modern immigration law—a 
maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations that engender waste, delay, and confu-
sion for the Government and petitioners alike”). 
 9 See ex post facto cases cited infra note 68. 
 10 See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation:  
Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 556–58 (2009) (“DHS 
regularly transfers detainees to faraway remote detention facilities, often making multiple 
transfers for a single detainee, without regard to whether the detainee has obtained 
counsel in his current location. . . . Motions to change venue to return a client to a facility 
in a jurisdiction where she has previously obtained counsel are frequently denied.”); see 
also DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION:  OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), available at http://www.ice. 
gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (“Although the majority of 
arrestees are placed in facilities in the field office where they are arrested, significant de-
tention shortages exist . . . . When this occurs, arrestees are transferred to areas where 
there are surplus beds.”). 
 11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing for the deportation of individuals con-
victed of crimes involving moral turpitude); Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is inapplicable in removal proceedings because they are civil); Mojica v. Reno, 970 
F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (classifying turnstile jumping in the New York City 
subway system leading to a “theft of services” misdemeanor conviction as a “crime of mor-
al turpitude,” subject to deportation (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ablett v. Brow-
nell, 240 F.2d 625, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (“[P]etty theft [is] a crime which does involve 
moral turpitude within the meaning of the immigration laws.”); In re Scarpulla, 15 I. & N. 
Dec. 139, 140–41 (1974) (“It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, 
June 2011] DEPORTATION IS DIFFERENT 1303 
 
Court has noted that such rules “bristle[] with severities” but has nev-
ertheless held that the civil label mandates such outcomes.12 
The Padilla case arose in the context of a long-term lawful perma-
nent resident who had been arrested in Kentucky with a large quanti-
ty of marijuana and pled guilty, allegedly in reliance upon his attor-
ney’s affirmative misadvice that the plea would not lead to his 
deportation.  In reality, the plea subjected Mr. Padilla to mandatory 
deportation.  The overwhelming majority of state and lower federal 
courts had held that, under the Sixth Amendment, defense attorneys 
have no obligation to advise their criminal defense clients regarding 
the “collateral” immigration consequences of a contemplated plea 
but that the delivery of affirmative misadvice is ineffective assistance 
of counsel.13  The Kentucky Supreme Court went in a different direc-
tion and held that even affirmative misadvice did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment because “collateral consequences are outside the scope 
of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel” and, 
therefore, it held “that counsel’s failure to advise Appellee of such 
collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides no 
basis for relief.”14 
In its decision, the United States Supreme Court first went to con-
siderable lengths to chronicle the evolution of deportation over the 
course of the twentieth century and concluded that deportation has 
become a dramatically more frequent and automatic result of crimi-
nal convictions.15  The Court then considered the Kentucky Supreme 
Court’s reliance upon the collateral consequences doctrine.  That 
doctrine, which was developed in the context of the Fifth Amend-
ment, dictates that in order for a defendant to knowingly and intelli-
gently waive her right to trial in accordance with due process, she 
must be informed of the direct, but not the collateral consequences, 
of her plea.16  The issue of whether a consequence is direct or colla-
teral is closely related to whether the consequence is a form of crimi-
 
has always been held to involve moral turpitude.”).  See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Pro-
portionality:  The Struggle for Balance in U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (discussing the need for constitutional proportionality analysis in immigra-
tion removal proceedings). 
 12 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952); see also infra note 57. 
 13 See, e.g., Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); People v. 
Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 312 (Ill. 1985); Morales v. Texas, 910 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1995); see also infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
 14 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 15 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
 16 See discussion infra notes 154–66. 
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nal punishment or not.17  It is in this context that the Padilla Court 
came to grapple with the difficult task of attempting to categorize the 
nature of deportation.  Ultimately, the Court avoided holding square-
ly on the issue by instead concluding that the “collateral versus direct 
distinction is . . . ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland18 claim concerning 
the specific risk of deportation.”19  In its discussion of the collateral 
consequences doctrine, however, the Court, for the first time in over 
a century, chimed in on the forgotten debate about the criminal or 
civil nature of deportation.  In so doing, it recognized the “unique 
nature of deportation,” and because deportation is now “an automat-
ic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders,” the Court declared 
it “‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the 
deportation context.”20  Eventually, the Court went on to hold on 
other grounds that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assis-
tance includes an affirmative obligation to warn defendants of the 
deportation consequences of a contemplated plea.21 
Prior to Padilla, the first and last reasoned consideration of the 
civil or criminal nature of deportation proceedings by the Supreme 
Court came in 1893 in the Fong Yue Ting v. United States decision.22  In 
that case, the Court considered whether three Chinese residents of 
the United States were entitled to criminal procedural protections 
when facing deportation for failing to comply with a registration law 
requiring “one credible white witness.”23  A divided Court held that 
criminal constitutional protections “have no application” in deporta-
tion proceedings.24  The Court’s reasoning in Fong Yue Ting rested on 
an extra-constitutional inherent powers theory that has since been 
discredited by scholars25 and by the Court itself.26  Nevertheless, in the 
 
 17 Id. 
18  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the controlling two-part 
test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
 19 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.   
 20 Id. at 1481. 
 21 Id. at 1483 (“[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give cor-
rect advice is equally clear.”).  See infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. 
 22 149 U.S. 698 (1893); cf. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (treating exclusion—not 
deportation—proceedings as civil). 
 23 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699. 
 24 Id. at 730. 
 25 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1996) 
(explaining that the notion that “the new United States government was to have major 
powers outside the Constitution is not intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records 
of the Convention, in the Federalist Papers, or in contemporary debates”); HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (summarizing the “withering criticism” of the inherent powers 
theory); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, 
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century since Fong Yue Ting, the federal courts have declined every 
opportunity and urging to reexamine the nature of removal proceed-
ings27—until now. 
In contrast, scholars have been calling for a reexamination of the 
nature of deportation for some time and with increasing frequency 
since the dramatic expansion of criminal deportation grounds in 
1996.28  A handful of scholars have specifically urged that removal 
 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 121 (“Thus, the external sovereignty argument for unlimited 
power over immigration was flawed to begin with and carries even less persuasive force 
today.”); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 21 (1998) (noting 
the pervasive critique of the extra-constitutional theory of immigration law that “[m]any 
have commented upon its persistence and almost all have vigorously condemned it”); Sa-
rah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:  Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 253 (2002) (“But the 
Court’s doctrinal justifications for the holdings ultimately are unsatisfying as an explana-
tion for the resort to inherent powers. . . . International law simply had nothing to say 
about the extent to which domestic law might constrain governmental power.”); see also T. 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY:  THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, 
AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 152 (2002); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States 
Sovereignty:  A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 
(1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration 
Law:  Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 
1631 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564–76 (1990). 
 26 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (“Our Constitution governs us and we must 
never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically 
granted . . . .”); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (“The United States is entirely a 
creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no other source.” (footnote 
omitted)); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 316–20 (discussing the Supreme Court’s growing 
unease with theories of extra-constitutional power); see also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 27 See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 594 (1952); Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993); Cabral-Avila 
v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 
630 (2d Cir. 1926); see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 25, at 153; Markowitz, supra note 7, at 
316–20.  But see United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (asserting 
that deportation is not a civil action but rather a criminal punishment when it is ordered, 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1), by a federal judge sentencing a defendant for a crimi-
nal conviction). 
 28 See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment:  A Historical Analysis of the British Prac-
tice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 116 
(1999) (“Despite one hundred years of case law consistently holding that deportation is 
not punishment, criticism of this conclusion has been ample throughout court opinions 
as well as scholarly articles.”); Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation:  
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34–35 
(1978) (arguing that “deportation proceedings should be deemed criminal or quasi-
criminal” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Con-
trol, and Punishment:  Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1890, 1893–94 (2000) (noting that, under various criminal law theories, “deporta-
tion of long-term lawful permanent residents for post-entry criminal conduct seems in 
most respects to be a form of punishment”); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immi-
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proceedings straddle the civil-criminal divide with some removal pro-
ceedings akin to criminal proceedings and others akin to civil pro-
ceedings.29  And others have urged that removal be treated as quasi-
criminal.30  Now, for the first time in American history, the Court has 
begun to align itself with these commentators, suggesting that depor-
 
gration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 
471 (2007) (“The underlying theories of deportation increasingly resemble those of crim-
inal punishment.”); Lisa Mendel, The Court’s Failure to Recognize Deportation as Punishment:  
A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 205, 207 (2000) 
(asking for a renewed critique of the Supreme Court’s view that deportation is not pu-
nishment due to Congressional legislation in 1996 that greatly expanded the grounds on 
which past crimes rendered lawful permanent residents deportable); Robert Pauw, A New 
Look at Deportation as Punishment:  Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure 
Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 313 (2000) (“It is this refusal to give serious 
consideration to the family rights at stake that makes deportation look much more like 
punishment . . . .”); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right?  A Closer Look at the 
True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29, 32 (2003) 
(“This article argues that immigration removal proceedings are truly criminal in na-
ture.”); Gregory L. Ryan, Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting:  Why the Inclusion of Perjury as an 
Aggravated Felony Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 989, 1010–12 (1997) 
(concluding that deportation under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
qualifies as punishment under the judicial definition established in Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86 (1958)); Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals and the 1996 Immigration Acts:  A 
Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 245, 261–73 (2004) (tracing juri-
sprudence and legal theories supporting the contention that deportation is punishment); 
Ethan Venner Torrey, “The Dignity of Crimes”:  Judicial Removal of Aliens and the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 188–91, 206 (1999) (proposing 
that because two hundred years of case law defines deportation as civil, not criminal, U.S. 
Attorneys should clarify in plea agreements that their prosecutions do not involve depor-
tation, which is instead a civil sanction wielded by the INS.); see also Developments in the 
Law:  Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1386 (1983) 
(“[T]he categorization of deportation as a civil rather than criminal proceeding has been 
severly criticized . . . .”).  See generally Markowitz, supra note 7, at 289 (exploring “the ten-
sion between the firmly established civil label and the contrary [criminal-like] experience 
of people subject to removal proceedings”). 
 29 See generally Kanstroom, supra note 28, at 1893–98 (drawing a line between civil-like de-
portation laws that follow the border control model and criminal-like deportation laws 
that follow the social control model); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 290–91 (distinguishing 
between “exclusion proceedings” that are civil in nature and “explusion proceedings” 
that are criminal in nature). 
 30 See, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 28, at 160–63 (suggesting quasi-criminal treatment of de-
portation); Fragomen, Jr., supra note 27, at 34–35 (arguing that deportation proceedings 
should be deemed criminal or quasi-criminal); Pauw, supra note 27, at 316–17 (“There is 
a middle ground of ‘quasi-criminal’ cases in which some, but not all, of the constitutional 
safeguards apply.”); Pinzon, supra note 28, at 32 (“[R]emoval proceedings are more crim-
inal in nature . . . .”); Salinas, supra note 28, at 261–73 (arguing that certain retroactive 
statutes, albeit civil in nature, can have such punitive consequences that they should be 
constitutionally prohibited); Torrey, supra note 28, at 191 (asserting that criminal prose-
cutors’ power over deportation undermines the characterization of deportation as civil). 
June 2011] DEPORTATION IS DIFFERENT 1307 
 
tation (but perhaps not exclusion)31 may fall in the crease between 
civil and criminal proceedings.  The import of the Padilla Court’s 
characterizations comes into view when we consider it in contrast to 
prior precedent and in the context of other evidence of the Court’s 
increasing discomfort with the civil label and its harsh application.32 
In this Article, I endeavor to do two things.  First, I argue that 
there is reason to be hopeful, that in the incrementalist modality of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, Padilla represents the first step—the 
camel’s nose under the tent—toward a full repudiation of Fong Yue 
Ting.  Second, I develop a framework courts could use to evaluate the 
rights of respondents under the Padilla conception of deportation.  
In regard to this latter endeavor, I argue that the unique nature of 
deportation would require a method of assessing rights that borrows 
from both the hard floor constitutional rights model, used in crimi-
nal proceedings, and the balancing model, Mathews v. Eldridge33 analy-
sis, used in civil proceedings.  This framework would require courts to 
first determine whether the interests protected by a given criminal 
procedure right are meaningfully at play in deportation proceedings.  
If so, the heart of the analysis will turn upon consideration of the na-
ture of the deportation proceedings at issue and whether such pro-
ceedings warrant hard floor criminal-type protections.  In order to 
make this determination, courts must consider whether the level of 
 
 31 All formal proceedings by which the United States seeks to expel a noncitizen from with-
in the United States or exclude her from lawful admission are now characterized as “re-
moval proceedings.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).  For the majority of our history, howev-
er, we recognized that exclusion proceedings (seeking to prevent lawful admission) and 
deportation proceeding (seeking to expel someone lawfully admitted) were two distinct 
animals.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (repealed 1996).  I utilize this distinction in the Article 
because, as discussed infra Part IV, I suspect that the Court’s discussion of the nature of 
removal proceedings at issue in Padilla was significantly affected by the fact that the pro-
ceedings sought to expel a person previously admitted by the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident.  Accordingly, I restrict my discussion to deportation proceedings be-
cause I believe the line between deportation and exclusion proceedings was, properly, 
critical to the Court’s analysis.  That is to say, I think the Court may have conceived of the 
nature of the removal quite differently if it involved a noncitizen apprehended at the 
border who had no prior contact with the United States.  See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 
329 (“The application of the modern test provides compelling support for the bifurcated 
approach:  exclusion is civil and expulsion is criminal.”). 
 32 See discussion infra notes 83–99.  See generally Legomsky, supra note 28, at 469 (positing 
that immigration law’s absorption of criminal justice norms “has produced a deportation 
regime so substantively harsh and inflexible that too often the penalties are cruelly dis-
proportionate to the transgressions”); Juliet Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 264, 264 (2006) (“Using removal as a baseline penalty robs the law of any capacity 
for adjustment to fit the seriousness of the immigration violation or its consequences for 
the individual and others.”). 
33  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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bias against the relevant class of respondents and the liberty interest 
at stake are analogous to those factors in criminal proceedings.  Final-
ly, careful consideration of the practical ways in which the individual 
right operates in deportation proceedings will be necessary to deter-
mine the scope of the right to be applied, which may well differ from 
the scope of the right in pure criminal proceedings. 
The article will proceed in four parts: (i) a brief review of pre-
Padilla jurisprudence regarding the nature of deportation proceed-
ings; (ii) an in-depth analysis of the Padilla case itself; (iii) an explora-
tion of the long-term impact of Padilla and why it should be unders-
tood as a potentially critical pivot point in immigration 
jurisprudence; and (iv) an articulation of a framework by which 
courts could make principled determinations regarding the nature 
and scope of respondents’ rights under Padilla’s conception of de-
portation.  I hasten to emphasize that I do not endeavor, in this 
piece, to defend or critique the Court’s characterization of deporta-
tion—just to describe it, help to understand its import, and aide the 
Court’s forthcoming jurisprudence.  I have previously laid out my 
own judgment that deportation straddles the civil-criminal divide, 
which comports in large part, but not fully, with the evolving concep-
tion of deportation I see foreshadowed in the Padilla decision.34 
I.  PRE-PADILLA JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE NATURE OF 
DEPORTATION 
A. The Origin of the Civil Label 
The origin of the civil label and the historic treatment of deporta-
tion’s precursors have been meticulously detailed elsewhere by myself 
and others.35  A brief review is, however, necessary to place the Padilla 
decision in context.  At the time of the framing of the Constitution, 
there was no animal known as “deportation” in American law.  The 
earliest precursor to modern deportation was banishment, which 
dates back to ancient times and was widely used as a form of criminal 
punishment for citizens and noncitizens alike.36  In common law Eng-
land, the government unquestionably possessed the power to both 
 
 34 Markowitz, supra note 7. 
 35 See generally Bleichmar, supra note 28; Cleveland, supra note 25, at 253; Markowitz, supra 
note 7. 
 36 William Garth Snider, Banishment:  The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under 
the First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 459–61 (1998) 
(citing examples of banishment as a criminal punishment in various societies dating back 
to 2285 B.C.). 
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exclude and expel noncitizens.37  Legal historians agree that the for-
mer power, to exclude or prevent entry, could be exercised by the 
king alone without any criminal process.38  In regard to the power to 
expel noncitizens from within England, there is some disagreement, 
as a theoretical matter, as to whether the power could be exercised 
through civil administrative fiat or solely through the criminal 
process.39  As a practical matter, however, the historical record de-
monstrates that expulsion was exercised exclusively as a common 
form of criminal punishment in England (imposed on both citizens 
and noncitizens) as early as the thirteenth century.40  Such criminal 
expulsions first took the form of “abjuration of the realm”41 and later 
as “transportation,”42 primarily to the American colonies. 
Similarly, the American colonies never utilized any civil method to 
expel noncitizens and the only method by which citizens or nonciti-
zens were removed from the colonies was through the criminal pu-
nishment of banishment.  Accordingly, the dominant historical mod-
els—common law England and the American colonies—which likely 
shaped the framers’ view of deportation, were exclusively and expli-
 
 37 See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 320–22. 
 38 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259–60 (“[Foreigners] are under the king’s 
protection; though liable to be sent home whenever the king sees occasion.”). 
 39 See id.; W. F. Craies, The Right of Aliens to Enter British Territory, 6 L. Q. REV. 27, 35 (1890) 
(“England was a complete asylum to the foreigner who did not offend against its 
laws . . . .”); On the Alien Bill, 42 EDINBURGH REV. 99, 100, 114 (1825) (arguing that “ex-
pulsion” is a “punishment on conviction in a court of justice, for certain offenses, where a 
natural-born subject might be left to work out his penalty at home” and that the “pu-
nishment” must be subject to the “severe and odious necessity of criminal law”).  Notably, 
the text of the Magna Carta itself provides some support for this view insofar as it guaran-
tees that “No Freeman [s]hall be . . . exiled, . . . but by the lawful judgment of his peers, 
or by the law of the land.”  MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39 (1215), reprinted in A HISTORY AND 
DEFENCE OF MAGNA CHARTA (1769). 
 40 See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 322. 
 41 Abjuration of the realm, a type of banishment whereby a criminal defendant could escape 
prosecution by seeking the assistance of clergy, confessing, and promising to voluntarily 
leave the realm and not return upon pain of death, became a common form of criminal 
punishment in England as early as the thirteenth century.  See William F. Craies, The Com-
pulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L. Q. REV. 388, 390, 393–96 (1890); see also Snider, 
supra note 36, at 461 (explaining the widespread use of abjuration in England between 
the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries). 
 42 Transportation was a form of criminal punishment whereby convicts would be sentenced 
to indentured servitude in or banished to the colonies.  Between 1718 and the end of 
transportation to the Americas in 1775, one quarter of all British immigrants to America, 
or approximately fifty thousand people, were sent as a result of being sentenced to trans-
portation as punishment for a crime.  The prevalence of this phenomenon was not lost 
on the colonists, who grew increasingly displeased with the practice.  In 1775, with the 
outbreak of the American Revolution, transportation to America came to an abrupt halt.  
See Bleichmar, supra note 28, at 124–29 (detailing the history of the transportation system 
and the Transportation Act of 1718). 
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citly criminal in nature.  For the first century after the founding of 
the United States, the regulation of immigration was largely left to 
the states.43  During this period as well, deportation was utilized only 
as punishment for serious crimes.44 
Throughout the majority of the nineteenth century the source 
and nature of the federal government’s authority to regulate immi-
gration was the source of much debate.45  The Supreme Court’s first 
significant discussion of the nature of the power did not come until 
1889 in its decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, commonly 
known as the Chinese Exclusion Case.46  The case has, in time, come 
to symbolize one of the worst episodes in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, alongside cases like Dred Scott v. Sandford47 and Plessy v. Fergu-
son,48 because of the explicit racism and xenophobia exhibited in the 
decision.49  However, the characterization of the immigration power 
announced in Chae Chan Ping still forms the basis of the modern 
 
 43 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (reviewing the state immigration laws during this period); see 
also EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 
1798–1965, at 389, 396–404 (1981).  One notable exception was the Alien Act of 1798, 
which purported to grant the President the power to expel noncitizens without criminal 
process.  See Cleveland, supra note 25, at 87–98 (discussing the Alien Act and controversy 
surrounding the power that it granted).  This power, however, expired two years later and 
was never exercised.  Moreover, contemporary and modern commentators alike widely 
agree that this aspect of the Act was unconstitutional.  See id. at 98 (quoting then-Vice 
President John C. Calhoun in 1832 as “assert[ing] that the unconstitutionality of the 
[Act] was ‘settled’”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 750 (1893) (Field, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the short-lived Act was “the subject of universal condemnation”); 
see also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 53–60 (1996) (discussing the debate); Matthew J. Lindsay, Immi-
gration as Invasion:  Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32 n.146 (2010).  But see Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the Constitu-
tion:  The First Deportation Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 63, 79–83 (2002) (arguing 
that the Act was a “proper implementation of congressional war power”). 
 44 Neuman, supra note 43, at 1841, 1844. 
 45 Earlier immigration cases arose as challenges to state attempts to regulate immigration, 
and, in those cases, the Court located the federal power over immigration as derived 
principally from the Foreign Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 
(1884); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 
U.S. 259 (1875); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).  See generally Cleveland, supra at 
note 25, at 106–12, 123–34 (noting the ascendancy of the Commerce Clause in federal 
courts’ acknowledgement of immigration as an exclusive federal power). 
 46 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 47 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 48 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 49 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (characterizing Chinese immigration as “for-
eign . . . encroachment” through “vast hordes of [the foreign nation’s] people crowding 
in upon us”); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting) (referring to “the obnoxious Chinese”). 
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Court’s conception of the nature of deportation—or at least its pre-
Padilla conception.  Chae Chan Ping was not a deportation case, but 
rather a case about the power of the United States to exclude or pre-
vent the entry of foreign nationals.  It was in this context that the Su-
preme Court first articulated the “inherent powers theory” in the 
immigration realm, which dictates that the immigration power is de-
rived not from any particular constitutional provision but is instead a 
power incident to the nature of sovereignty and thus not subject to 
the Constitution’s limits relevant to criminal proceedings.50  It was not 
at all clear from Chae Chan Ping whether this conception of the immi-
gration power also applied to deportation of noncitizens already 
present in the United States.51 
However, in 1893, the Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting, for the 
first time explicitly applied the inherent powers theory and the civil 
label to the deportation context.52  Fong Yue Ting involved three Chi-
nese nationals who challenged the constitutionality of the statutes 
under which they were ordered to be deported because, they 
claimed, the statutes subjected them to the criminal punishment of 
deportation without affording them the applicable constitutional 
protection.  The Court held that the power to expel and the power to 
exclude were “in truth but parts of one and the same power”53 and 
thus the power to deport was also inherent in the nature of sove-
reignty and the criminal constitutional protections, including the 
“right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and cruel and unusual punishments, ha[d] no application.”54  
 
 50 See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.  The Court did not explicitly characterize the exclu-
sion proceedings as civil but its refusal to even address the criminal procedure claim is 
strong evidence that it conceived of exclusion as a civil proceeding.  The criminal consti-
tutional rights at issue in Chae Chan Ping was the prohibition against ex post facto law.  
Chae Chan Ping had left the United States with a valid reentry permit and, while in tran-
sit to return, Congress passed a new act purporting to annul the reentry permits of Chi-
nese nationals. 
 51 Indeed in the years immediately following Chae Chan Ping the Court issued several deci-
sions which suggested that its analysis may apply only to exclusion and not expulsion cas-
es.  See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (characterizing Con-
gress’s immigration power as pertaining to “[t]he supervision of the admission of aliens 
into the United States” and stating that it is a “maxim of international law that every sove-
reign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, 
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such 
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe”); Lau Ow Bew v. United 
States, 144 U.S. 47, 62 (1892) (suggesting a limitation on Congress’s power to regulate 
persons already admitted to the United States as permanent residents). 
 52 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. 
 53 Id. at 713. 
 54 Id. at 730. 
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However, unlike Chae Chan Ping, which had been unanimous, Fong 
Yue Ting divided the Court with three justices, including Justice Field, 
the author of Chae Chan Ping, dissenting.  The dissents argued that 
the majority failed to appreciate the historically distinct status of de-
nizens, the precursors to modern permanent residents,55 and the his-
toric distinctions between the power to exclude, which was civil, and 
the power to expel, which was criminal.56  In the hundred-plus years 
between Fong Yue Ting and Padilla, the Court repeatedly reaffirmed, 
or at minimum relied upon, the holding that deportation is civil, and, 
while it at times displayed some discomfort with application of the la-
bel, it never once substantively reexamined the civil or criminal na-
ture of deportation.57 
B. The Demise of the Inherent Powers Theory—The Rationale Behind the 
Civil Label Is Abandoned but the Holding Remains 
In the mid-twentieth century in two cases,58 the Court re-examined 
the “inherent powers theory,” which underlied the civil label and re-
soundingly repudiated it.59  First in Reid v. Covert, the Court held that 
“[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its 
power and authority have no other source.  It can only act in accor-
 
 55 Id. at 736–38 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
 56 Id. at 755–57 (Field, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra notes 36–44 and accompany-
ing text. 
 57 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (calling the civil designation 
of deportation “debatable” but refusing to reconsider this settled aspect of law); Fong 
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (displaying discomfort with the civil label by 
noting that expulsion is a “drastic measure”); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 
(1947) (referring to the “high and momentous” stakes in expulsion proceedings); 
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (characterizing the impact of an expulsion 
order as a “great hardship”); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912) (rely-
ing in part on the civil label to permit the retroactive application of a law providing for 
the cancellation of fraudulently obtained naturalization certificates); Lem Moon Sing v. 
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 546–47 (1895) (relying in part on the civil label to uphold ju-
risdiction-stripping provisions that insulated executive action in the immigration arena 
from judicial review). 
 58 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 59 See generally Cleveland, supra note 25, at 131 (discussing the inherent powers doctrine as 
“a source of authority inherent in international law and sovereignty”); Markowitz, supra 
note 7, at 309–20 (discussing the inherent powers theory, from which the power to ex-
clude or expel citizens is derived).  In time, the inherent powers theory has come to be 
associated most directly with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).  While Curtiss-Wright continues to be cited approvingly 
regarding the deference courts owe in foreign affairs, there is no good Supreme Court 
case law relying upon the inherent powers holding in Curtiss-Wright. 
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dance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”60  In 
Afroyim v. Rusk, a case involving the power of Congress to expatriate 
citizens who vote in foreign elections, the Court drove the point 
home further by emphatically explaining that the United States does 
not have 
any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen’s 
citizenship without his assent.  This power cannot . . . be sustained as an 
implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations.  Other nations 
are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and we can draw no sup-
port from theirs. . . . Our Constitution governs us and we must never for-
get that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifi-
cally granted or those that are necessary and proper to carry out the 
specifically granted ones.61 
Notwithstanding the Court’s repudiation of the rationale behind 
the civil label, it continued to apply the label after Reid and Afroyim.62  
Moreover, the Court never expressed any alternative rationale for the 
civil label and thus, after rejecting the inherent powers theory, has 
left the civil designation of deportation without any articulated justi-
fication.63 
 
 60 354 U.S. at 5–6 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).  The Reid Court held that court-
martial jurisdiction could not be constitutionally applied to trial of civilian dependents of 
members of the armed forces overseas in times of peace, for capital offenses.  While the 
decision in Reid was a four-vote plurality opinion, Justice Harlan filed a separate concur-
ring opinion adding a fifth vote rejecting the inherent powers theory.  Id. at 66 (Harlan, J. 
concurring) (“The powers of Congress, unlike those of the English Parliament, are con-
stitutionally circumscribed.  Under the Constitution[,] Congress has only such powers as 
are expressly granted or those that are implied as reasonably necessary and proper to car-
ry out the granted powers.”). 
 61 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257. 
 62 See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998) (noting that the “risk that [a res-
ident alien’s] testimony might subject him to deportation is not a sufficient ground for 
asserting [the Fifth Amendment] privilege [against self-incrimination], given the civil 
character of a deportation proceeding”); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 
(1984) (describing deportation proceedings as “purely civil” actions); United States ex rel. 
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923) (“And since deportation proceedings are in 
their nature civil, the rule excluding involuntary confessions could have no applica-
tion.”); Conteh v. Gonzalez, 461 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining “the invitation to 
transplant the categorical approach root and branch—without any modification whatev-
er—into the civil removal context”). 
 63 The inherent powers theory has reared its head again, at least in name, in the context of 
recent Bush administration robust articulations of the President’s power in war and na-
tional security matters.  See generally Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Execu-
tive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569, 588 (2010) (characterizing the Bush position as a 
sloppy mixture of the unitary and inherent power models); Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Ex-
ecutive Power:  A Comparative Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480, 2484–85 (2006) (recognizing 
that modern scholars advance various permutations of the inherent powers theory and 
describing the Bush administration’s internal memos as “[t]he most recent executive 
branch defense of the inherent power theory”).  However, these recent resurrections of 
the inherent powers rhetoric are, in fact, of an entirely different nature than the theory 
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C. Doctrinal Incoherence—The Civil Label’s Tension with Application of 
Criminal Doctrine 
While the Court, even in Padilla, continues to utilize the civil label 
to describe deportation proceedings, increasingly that label is in ten-
sion with the application of criminal, or quasi-criminal, doctrine in 
deportation proceedings.  Much has been written in recent years 
about the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice norms in de-
portation proceedings.64  The majority of this writing has focused on 
 
articulated in Fong Yue Tung and Chae Chan Ping and rejected in Reid and Afroyim.  In this 
context the executive branch has attempted to develop a broad theory of the powers in-
herent in the Article II explicit grants of power to the President.  See, e.g., Brief for Peti-
tioner at 14, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (“First, the Presi-
dent’s inherent powers as Commander in Chief are substantially more robust than 
recognized by the court of appeals.”); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Part V, 31–39 (Aug. 1, 2002), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogation
memo20020801.pdf (arguing that any statute that would interfere with the President’s 
ability to interrogate enemy combatants would impermissibly encroach on the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief powers and would therefore be unconstitutional); Memorandum 
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to the President (Sept. 25, 2001), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm (grounding an assertion that 
the President enjoys unenumerated executive powers in the Vesting Clause, stating that 
“the enumeration in Article II marks the points at which several traditional executive 
powers were diluted or reallocated.  Any other, unenumerated executive powers, however, 
were conveyed to the President by the Vesting Clause” (emphasis in original)).  With the 
arguable exception of one sentence in one brief, the Bush administration’s inherent 
powers claims did not involve claims of powers inherent in the nature of sovereignty de-
rived from some extra-constitutional source.  See Brief for Petitioner at 11, Tenet v. Doe, 
544 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1395) (“The government’s ability to carry out [intelligence] 
operations is essential to national security and is an inherent attribute of national sove-
reignty.”).  Critically, even the more limited articulation of the inherent powers theory 
has been rejected by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 
(“[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President . . . . [And the Constitution] most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”).  
Moreover, the Obama administration has largely abandoned reliance on the Bush admin-
istration’s inherent powers theory.  See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Gov-
ernment’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, 3–8, 
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 08-
442) (arguing the administration’s detention authority based on the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force); see also Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 17–18, Al-Marri 
v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (No. 08-368) (relying on statutory authority for deten-
tion). 
 64 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?  Immigration Courts and the Adjudica-
tion of Fourth And Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010) (exploring the proce-
dural deficiencies of the current system and offering proposals to address the problem); 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 
(2009) (attempting to theorize criminal prosecutions of offenses related to migration); 
Legomsky, supra note 28, at 255 (concluding that the Court should not give special defe-
rence to Congress in immigration cases); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocu-
mented:  Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
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the incorporation of what Professor Legomsky calls criminal “en-
forcement norms” into deportation proceedings in contrast to the 
lack of any corresponding incorporation of criminal “adjudication 
norms.”65  The criminal enforcement norms that have come to domi-
nate immigration law include the increased criminalization of immi-
gration violations, the increased immigration consequences of even 
minor criminal violations, the use of preventative detention, and the 
increased role of traditional criminal justice actors, such as local po-
lice, in immigration enforcement.66  In contrast, the criminal adjudi-
catory norms that have yet to be incorporated into deportation pro-
ceedings include basic procedural protections such as the right to 
appointed counsel,67 the prohibition on ex post facto laws,68 protections 
 
REG. 639, 640 (2004) (“[W]ell–accepted historical matrices are increasingly inadequate to 
address the complex issues raised by various U.S. government practices in the so-called 
‘war on terrorism.’”); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and 
Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 83–86 (2005) (tracing the 
relationship between criminal punishment and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citi-
zenship & Severity:  Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
611, 616–20 (2003) (describing the criminalization of immigration law); Pauw, supra note 
28, at 307 (noting that constitutional safeguards that traditionally apply in the context of 
criminal prosecution should apply alike in immigration cases); Pinzon, supra note 28; Di-
nesh Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You’re Out!  The Crumbling Distinction 
Between the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the Twenty-First Century, 35 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 135, 148–51 (2008) (explaining that “criminal proceedings are undertaken with 
the desired immigration outcome in mind”); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:  Im-
migrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (“The merger of 
[criminal law and immigration law] in both substance and procedure has created parallel 
systems in which immigration law and the criminal justice system are merely nominally 
separate.”); see also Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Con-
stitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 18–19 (1990) (discussing the oddity of the lack of consti-
tutional protections afforded to noncitizens in deportation proceedings in contrast to the 
rather robust constitutional protections afforded to noncitizens in other realms, such as 
criminal proceedings). 
 65 See Legomsky, supra note 28, at 473–75. 
 66 Id. at 482–86 (discussing increased immigration consequences of crimes); Stumpf, supra 
note 64, at 386 (“Between 1908 and 1980, there were approximately 56,000 immigrants 
deported based on criminal convictions.  In 2004 alone, there were more than 88,000 
such deportations.”); id. at 378 (tracing the convergence of criminal and immigration 
law, in which “[i]mmigration violations previously handled as civil matters are increasing-
ly addressed as criminal offenses”). 
 67 Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Because immigration proceed-
ings are of a civil rather than criminal nature, aliens in removal proceedings ‘enjoy[ ] no 
specific right to counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.” (quoting Jian 
Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2005))); Lopez-Vega v. Hold-
er, 336 F. App’x 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have never extended a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to immigration proceedings.”); Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 
464 (8th Cir. 2004) (“It is well-settled that, while there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, aliens have a statutory right to counsel at their own expense . . . .” (citation omit-
ted)); Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no Sixth 
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against double jeopardy,69 and the right to trial by jury.70  This asym-
metry has contributed to what Professor Stumpf aptly dubbed the 
“crimmigration crisis.”71 
 
Amendment right to counsel in deportation hearings . . . .”); Mustata v. U.S. Dept. of Jus-
tice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is clear that the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply to civil deportation proceedings.”); Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 
144 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Deportation hearings are deemed civil proceedings and thus aliens 
have no constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.”); Lozada v. INS, 
857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Because deportation proceedings are deemed to be civil, 
rather than criminal, in nature, petitioners have no constitutional right to counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 68 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (holding that retroactive application of 
new grounds for deportation did not violate the ex post facto clause); Galvan v. Press, 347 
U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“[I]t has been the unbroken rule of this Court that [the ex post facto 
clause] has no application to deportation.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 
594–96 (1952) (stating that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws does not 
apply to laws affecting deportation); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (stat-
ing that “[t]he prohibition of ex post facto laws in Article I, § 9, has no application” to de-
portation); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 722–24 (1893) (rejecting an ar-
gument that a law that subjected a Chinese citizen to removal retroactively was 
unconstitutional as an ex post facto law); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 557 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(stating that an argument derived from the Ex Post Facto Clause is not available to peti-
tioner “because deportation statutes are civil in nature”); United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 
831, 834 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A long and unwavering line of authority has established that sta-
tutes retroactively setting criteria for deportation do not violate the ex post facto provi-
sion.”); United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The ex post facto clause 
has been unswervingly held as inapplicable to matters of deportation.”); Artukovic v. INS, 
693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of 
attainder does not apply to deportation statutes.”). 
 69 United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because deportation proceed-
ings are civil and not criminal in nature, they cannot form the basis for a double jeopardy 
claim . . . .”); accord Figuereo-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 382 F. App’x 211, 213 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“To the extent that Figuereo-Sanchez is claiming a violation of double jeopardy by 
arguing that he is being punished twice for his criminal offense, his claim lacks merit be-
cause a deportation proceeding is a purely civil action and the purpose of deporation is 
not to punish past transgressions.” (internal quotations marks omitted)); United States v. 
Danson, 115 F. App’x 486, 488 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It is settled law that deporation is a civil 
proceeding and is not considered a criminal punishment, regardless of its harsh conse-
quences.”); De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364–65 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating 
that the double jeopardy clause applies only to proceedings  that are criminal in nature); 
Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (denying petitioner’s double jeopardy ar-
gument due to the classification of deportation as a civil procedure). 
 70 Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (explaining that proceedings to enforce im-
migration regulations are not criminal prosecutions and therefore “may be properly de-
volved upon an executive department or subordinate officials thereof, and that the find-
ings of fact reached by such officials, after a fair though summary hearing, may 
constitutionally be made conclusive, as they are made by the provisions of the act in ques-
tion”); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904) (finding that the 
constitutional right of trial by jury has no application to deportation); Fong Yue Ting, 149 
U.S. at 730 (same). 
 71 Stumpf, supra note 64, at 377. 
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While this asymmetry and evidence of the paltry level of justice af-
forded to respondents in deportation proceedings is disturbing, it is 
not necessarily a marker of doctrinal incoherence.  That is to say, in 
theory, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent about a civil regime 
which shares some attributes with the criminal process but which 
does not trigger the Constitution’s criminal procedural protections.72  
In fact, the incoherence comes from exactly the opposite phenome-
non:  courts’ adherence to the civil label and simultaneous applica-
tion of distinctly and uniquely criminal procedural norms.  While the 
literature has tended to focus on the criminal rights that have not 
been applied to deportation proceedings—and many of the most crit-
ical rights have not73—it is in some ways more surprising to observe 
the many criminal doctrinal strands that have taken root in purpor-
tedly civil deportation proceedings.  The doctrinal spheres where this 
can be seen most clearly are:  the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel, the rule of lenity, the void for vagueness doctrine and the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule.  To be clear, and as discussed below, 
 
 72 Legomsky, supra note 28, at 472 (“[T]he courts have uniformly insisted that deportation 
is not punishment and that, therefore, the criminal procedural safeguards do not apply 
in deportation proceedings.  Those and similar principles remain untouched by the gra-
dual importation of criminal justice norms into immigration law.  As a result, the criminal 
justice model has had no discernible benefits for immigrants.”). 
 73 See id., at 499–500, 515–16 (listing the rights afforded to criminal defendants that have 
been rejected to individuals facing deportation proceedings, including double jeopardy, 
Miranda warnings, the privilege against self-incrimination, trial by jury, restrictions on 
bills of attainder, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, the Sixth Amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the requirement of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, and the bar on hearsay evidence); discussion supra notes 67–
69.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923) (noting that 
involuntary confessions are admissible at deportation hearing); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 
730 (stating that the Eight Amendment does not restrict deportation because it is not 
punishment); Briseno v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Bustos-Torres 
v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056–57 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to recognize the right to con-
front an accuser and bar hearsay evidence at a deportation hearing and stating generally 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence have no application); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 
1029–30 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding mandatory deportation of Nazi war criminals because 
deportation does not fall into the category of legislative punishment, a prerequisite for 
finding a bill of attainder); Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469–70 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at government expense in 
deportation proceedings); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (allow-
ing admission of statements made without Miranda warnings); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 
F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Oliver, 517 F.2d at 428 (refusing to apply double 
jeopardy to a civil deportation proceeding and finding that the Eighth Amendment does 
not restrict deportation because it is not punishment); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 
399–401 (7th Cir. 1975) (allowing admission of statements made without Miranda warn-
ings); United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that there is 
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at government expense in deportation proceed-
ings); Burquez v. INS, 513 F.2d 751, 755 (10th Cir. 1975) (same). 
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not all of these areas of law operate in precisely the same way in de-
portation proceedings as they do in criminal proceedings.  Indeed, in 
some instances, courts go through significant jurisprudential gymnas-
tics to make them apply at all, but this is precisely the point.  The way 
courts twist themselves in knots, using legal fiction heaped upon legal 
fiction, to make the criminal square pegs fit in the civil round holes is 
the best evidence of the doctrinal incoherence that currently exists in 
courts’ treatment of the nature of deportation proceedings. 
The right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceed-
ings is, of course, derived from the Sixth Amendment’s explicit pro-
scription.74  Since the Sixth Amendment is applicable only to criminal 
proceedings, it generally follows that there is no right to effective 
counsel in civil proceedings.75  As we would expect, the civil label of 
deportation proceedings has led courts to generally reject claims that 
respondents are entitled to appointed counsel in deportation pro-
ceedings.76  However, counterintuitively, the Attorney General, the 
 
 74 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” a defendant shall 
have the right to “the Assistance of Counsel for his defense”); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162, 166 (2002) (“[A]ssistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness [in a criminal 
trial] does not meet the constitutional mandate [of the Sixth Amendment] . . . .” (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984))). 
 75 Absent a governmental obligation to supply counsel in civil cases, a client is bound by the 
actions of his or her attorney.  See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1985) 
(holding that a taxpayer was not excused from filing late by reasonable reliance on the at-
torney handling the tax matter); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (find-
ing “no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner’s [negligence] claim because 
of his counsel’s unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client”); Watson v. 
Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) (“There is no constitutional or statutory right for 
an indigent to have counsel appointed in a civil case [alleging violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment against police officers].  It of course follows there is no constitutional 
or statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil case.”(internal citation omit-
ted)). 
 76 See, e.g., Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1469–70 (holding no Sixth Amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel at government expense in deportation proceedings); Gasca-Kraft, 522 
F.2d at 152 (same); Burquez, 513 F.2d at 755 (same).  By statute, noncitizens in deporta-
tion proceedings do have the right to be represented by counsel, but not at the expense 
of the government.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2006).  However, at least one 
Court of Appeals has recognized at least a potential, though as of yet still theoretical, 
right to appointed counsel in deportation proceedings under the due process clause. 
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568–69 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that “[w]here 
an unrepresented indigent would require counsel to present his position adequately to 
an immigration judge, he must be provided with a lawyer at the Government’s expense.  
Otherwise ‘fundamental fairness’ would be violated” and adopting a case-by-case ap-
proach to the issue of government-funded counsel); see also Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 
103, 108 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that lack of representation may support a finding 
that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) abused its discretion in deporting an 
alien); United States v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (“Informing a 
prisoner with total resources of $30.00, a stranger in a strange land with a complete lack 
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Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the majority of circuits 
have recognized a right to effective assistance of counsel in deporta-
tion proceedings77 and have frequently reversed deportation orders 
or granted motions to reopen proceedings based on ineffective assis-
tance.78  The right to effective assistance in “civil” deportation pro-
ceedings is couched in the rhetoric of the due process clause:  “Inef-
fective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of 
due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that 
 
of knowledge of the language of that country, that he had the right to counsel is almost 
an empty gesture.”).  See generally Irving A. Appleman, Right to Counsel in Deportation Pro-
ceedings, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 130, 132 (1976); Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deporta-
tion—Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel?, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 290 (1975), available at 
http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Vol08/DavisVol08_Black.pdf; Jean Pierre Espi-
noza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings:  Matter of Compean and the 
Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 65, 73–74 (2010); Charles Gordon, Right to 
Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV. 875, 883 (1961); William Haney, Depor-
tation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 177 (1970); Pauw, supra note 28, at 340; 
Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens:  Litigation and Admin-
istrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1660–63 (1997); David A. Robertson, An Opportu-
nity to Be Heard:  The Right to Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019 
(1988). 
 77 See, e.g., Fadiga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings); Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857, 
863–64 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 
2004) (same); Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); Saa-
kian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 962 
F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); In re Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1–3 
(2009) (same); In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 637–40 (1988), aff’d 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st 
Cir. 1988); see also In re Bassel Nabih Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 558 (2003) (“[S]ince [In 
re] Lozada was decided 15 years ago, the circuit courts have consistently continued to rec-
ognize that despite having no right to appointed counsel in an immigration hearing, a 
respondent has a Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and 
may be denied that right if counsel prevents the respondent from meaningfully present-
ing his or her case.”).  But see Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798–99 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that any ineffectiveness of privately retained counsel cannot be imputed to the 
government to establish a Fifth Amendment violation); Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 
861 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is no constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to 
effective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding.  Removal proceedings are civil; 
there is no constitutional right to an attorney, so an alien cannot claim constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  To the extent Rafiyev’s counsel was ineffective, the fed-
eral government was not accountable for her substandard performance; it is imputed to 
the client.” (citations omitted)). 
 78 See, e.g., Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 2008) (granting petition for review 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel); Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 144–45 (same); Sanchez v. 
Keisler, 505 F.3d 641, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 163 
(5th Cir. 2006) (same); Osei v. INS, 305 F.3d 1205, 1206–07 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); Saa-
kian, 252 F.3d at 23 (same); Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(same); In re N-K- & V-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 879, 881–82 (1997) (granting motion to reopen 
based on claim of ineffective assistance); In re Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I. & N. Dec. 472, 473–
74 (1996) (finding that ineffective assistance of counsel may amount to “exceptional cir-
cumstances” in the context of a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order). 
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the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”79  How-
ever, in practice, it functions similarly to the facially lower standard of 
“reasonable performance” required under the Sixth Amendment.80  
The oddity of a right to effective assistance, without the correspond-
ing right to any assistance at all, is perhaps the clearest example of 
doctrinal incoherence in the courts’ treatment of the nature of re-
moval proceedings. 
The Court’s application of the traditionally criminal void for va-
gueness and rule of lenity doctrines to “civil” deportation proceed-
ings are additional examples of doctrinal incoherence.  Under the 
void for vagueness doctrine, a penal statute must be written with suf-
ficient definiteness as to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden.81  As the D.C. 
Circuit has explained: 
In the criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity 
in draftsmanship than in civil contexts, commensurate with the bedrock 
principle that in a free country citizens who are potentially subject to 
criminal sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior that may 
cause sanctions to be visited upon them.82 
However, in Jordan v. De George, the Supreme Court applied the crim-
inal vagueness doctrine to examine the constitutionality of a deporta-
 
 79 In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638. 
 80 Accord Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (“[A] defendant must overcome the pre-
sumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy.” (internal quotations omitted)); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 
365, 381–82 (1986) (discussing the strong presumption of reasonableness of counsel’s 
performance required by Strickland and noting that, “Strickland’s standard, although by no 
means insurmountable, is highly demanding”); cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689 (1984) (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferen-
tial. . . . [A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must over-
come the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 690 (“[T]he 
court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate as-
sistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.”). 
 81 Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544–46 (1971) (holding that an ordinance that 
gave insufficient notice to the average person of what constituted a violation was void); 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“The constitutional requirement of 
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.”); Boyce Mo-
tor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 340 (1952) (“A criminal statute must be suffi-
ciently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its 
penalties . . . .”); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one may be re-
quired at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.  
All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”). 
 82 United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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tion statute for persons convicted of “crime[s] involving moral turpi-
tude.”83  The Court explicitly recognized the incongruence of apply-
ing the criminal doctrine to these civil proceedings but explained 
that “[d]espite the fact that this is not a criminal statute, we shall nev-
ertheless examine the application of the vagueness doctrine to this 
case” because of the “grave nature of deportation.”84  Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague.85  
Recently in Arriaga v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit explained that the 
“‘void for vagueness’ doctrine is chiefly applied to criminal legisla-
tion.  Laws with civil consequences receive less exacting vagueness 
scrutiny” but that the Supreme Court assessed the deportation provi-
sion “as if it imposed a criminal penalty.”86 
Similarly, in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,87 the Court applied the “rule 
of lenity”—commonly, though not exclusively,88 associated with crim-
inal proceedings—to deportation proceedings.  The case required 
the Court to interpret the meaning of a statutory provision that pro-
vided for the deportation of individuals who had been convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude “more than once.”89  The Court 
again reasoned that “deportation is a drastic measure and at times 
the equivalent of banishment or exile” and held that “since the stakes 
are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress 
meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the 
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”90  Since 
Phelan, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the principle that 
courts should construe ambiguous immigration statutes favorably to 
noncitizens.91 
 
 83 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951). 
 84 Id. at 231. 
 85 Id. at 232; see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123–24 (1967). 
 86 521 F.3d 219, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 87 333 U.S. 6 (1948). 
 88 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (applying rule of leni-
ty to cases involving Native Americans) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (same). 
 89 Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S at 7. 
 90 Id. at 10.  See generally David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper 
Place:  A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 479, 491–92 (2007) (describing 
the “immigration rule of lenity”); Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and 
Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 372–73 (2007) (stating that the rule of lenity 
was “[d]esigned by the Court to protect a vulnerable minority”). 
 91 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (analyzing the rule of lenity alongside the 
general “presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provisions” 
to determine that Congress had not fully considered the costs and benefits of applying a 
statute to pre-enactment convictions); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court’s decisions directing courts to apply the rule 
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The increasingly frequent application of the criminal exclusionary 
rule is yet another example of the courts importing uniquely criminal 
doctrine into purportedly civil deportation proceedings.  The famili-
ar rule in a criminal proceeding is that evidence obtained as a result 
of an unlawful search or seizure will be suppressed if the link between 
the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated.92  In 
contrast, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is 
admissible in civil proceedings.93  In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme 
Court specifically considered whether the exclusionary rule should 
operate in deportation proceedings.94  In a 5–4 opinion written by 
Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule 
does not ordinarily apply to “civil deportation hearing[s].”95  Howev-
 
of lenity in the immigration context); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) 
(noting the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deporta-
tion statutes in favor of the alien”); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (weighing the 
humanitarian values of keeping families together with the statutory language at issue to 
determine that the statute should be read in favor of the alien); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 
120, 128–29 (1964) (determining that under § 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Natio-
nality Act, an alien who committed crimes while a naturalized citizen could not be de-
ported after being denaturalized); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958) (“When 
Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 596–97 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the rule of lenity in 
reaching a favorable statutory interpretation for the noncitizen); Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 
1161, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 543 (6th Cir. 
2003) (acknowledging the presumption of favoring an alien when a statutory clause is 
ambiguous, but concluding that the clause in question was not ambiguous); Jobson v. 
Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 376 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the immigration rule of lenity re-
quires the narrowest meaning that may be adopted); De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 
1043 (4th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging the presumption of leniency but ruling against the 
noncitizen).  See generally Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Defe-
rence, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 520–23 (2003) (describing the Supreme Court’s creation 
of the immigration rule of lenity and its broad application in lower courts); cf. In re Haru-
tunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. 583, 588–89 (1974) (holding that the rule of lenity does not apply 
to statutory provisions applicable to exclusion). 
 92 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1984) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963)) (referring to the rule); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(holding that the exclusion rule applies in criminal prosecutions in state courts as well as 
federal courts). 
 93 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) (“[T]he Court never has applied [the 
exclusionary rule] to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.”).  How-
ever, there is case law demonstrating that, in fact, the exclusionary rule was previously 
employed in removal proceedings. See, e.g., In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (1980) 
(terminating proceedings where the government’s sole evidence supporting removability 
was suppressed). 
 94 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034. 
 95 Id.  But see Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”:  Widespread Constitutional Violations in 
the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. 
REV 1109, 1116–22, 1140–46 (2008) (arguing that the purely civil nature of deportation 
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er, the Court suggested that the exclusionary rule may be available if 
the Fourth Amendment violations by immigration authorities are 
“widespread” or “egregious.”96  Since Lopez-Mendoza, the BIA and cir-
cuit courts have expanded on Justice O’Connor’s egregiousness stan-
dard, opening the door to application of the exclusionary rule in de-
portation proceedings.97  And indeed, suppression motions, while still 
the exception, are becoming an increasingly frequent feature of de-
portation proceedings.98  Again, the purported burden on respon-
 
proceedings was an underpinning of Justice O’Connor’s opinion and that the corrosion 
of the understanding of deportation proceedings as civil in recent years warrants a recon-
sideration of Lopez-Mendoza). 
 96 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51. 
 97 See United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 227 n.1, 228–30 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding 
suppression of evidence related to the defendant’s identity to be appropriate on other 
grounds); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234–36 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the 
egregiousness standard in a deportation hearing but finding no violation); United States 
v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that suppression of a defendant’s 
immigration file in a prosecution for illegal re-entry may be appropriate in cases of egre-
gious Fourth Amendment violations); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 
1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that Lopez-Mendoza does not prevent the suppression 
of all identity-related evidence); Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 
2004) (considering an argument based on the egregiousness standard in a deportation 
hearing but ultimately finding no violation); Miguel v. INS, 359 F.3d 408, 411 & n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (declining to reach the applicability of the exclusionary rule because the im-
migration judge did not rely on any of the evidence seized); Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 
282 F.3d 487, 492–93 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to reach the issue of egregiousness be-
cause the investigatory stop was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances); 
Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 492–93, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that immigration 
agents committed egregious violations by seizing Orhorhaghe outside of his apartment 
and conducting a warrantless search based on his Nigerian sounding name); In re Velas-
quez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 380 (1986) (affirming a denial of a motion for suppression be-
cause the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings); In re Benitez, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 173, 175 (1984) (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule is not applicable 
in deportation proceedings and finding the record sufficient to support deportation even 
without the contested evidence).  But see United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 
1185–86 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining that Lopez-Mendoza does not control); United 
States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753–54 (8th Cir. 2001) (electing not to apply 
Lopez-Mendoza); Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1997) (assuming that 
in deportation proceedings the exclusionary rule does not exclude evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 98 BESS CHIU, LYNLY EGYES, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & JAYA VASANDANI, CARDOZO IMMIGRATION 
JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE:  A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID 
OPERATIONS 14 (2009), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay. 
aspx?ccmd=ContentEdit&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=84&contentid=11652&folderid=224
6 (“Since 2006, there has been a nine-fold increase in the filing of suppression motions, a 
twenty-two-fold increase in suppression motions related to home raids, and a five-fold in-
crease in the grant rate of suppression motions.”); see also Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Op-
erations and the Fourth Amendment:  Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Ra-
ids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 527 (2011) (noting that U.S. courts of appeals have allowed 
suppression motions for egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment and advocating 
for more suppression). 
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dents seeking suppression in “civil” deportation proceedings (egre-
gious violation) is, on its face, higher than the burden on criminal 
defendants (mere violation).  However, as a practical matter the types 
of violations that ultimately result in suppression are frequently not 
so dissimilar.99  So, once again, we see a uniquely criminal law doc-
trine creeping into the “civil” deportation realm.100 
 
 99 See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule:  An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1365, 1375 (2008) (citing studies demonstrating that less than 1.3% of suppression 
motions are successful); Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary 
Rule and Deterrence, 75 MO. L. REV. 459, 470–73 (2010) (explaining that “[e]ven if the po-
lice were to commit egregious misconduct and violate a suspect’s constitutional rights, 
the probability that the evidence would be suppressed (p) is still very low” and that “the 
odds are overwhelming that the suppression hearing will be unsuccessful”).  See generally 
U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO B-171019, IMPACT OF 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 9–11 (1979) (citing data 
reflecting the use and success rate of suppression motions in criminal proceedings); 
Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of 
the Exclusionary Rule:  The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 611, 660 (1983) (analyzing the GAO study); Peter Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclu-
sionary Rule:  An Empirical Assessment, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596 (1983) (distinguish-
ing success rates for motions to suppress based on the type of evidence). 
100 There are additional examples of doctrinal drift from criminal law into deportation law.  
For example, the Fifth Amendment provides a privilege against self-incrimination in “any 
criminal case.”  Therefore, since deportation proceedings are considered civil, as a tech-
nical matter, immigrants cannot refuse to answer questions simply because the answers 
will lead to their deportation.  Indeed, when immigrants refuse to answer such questions 
the law permits a negative inference to be drawn from their silence.  However, as a prac-
tical matter, immigrants are protected in much the same way as criminal defendants be-
cause courts have routinely held that the negative inference from silence is not sufficient 
to sustain the government’s burden in a deportation proceeding.  See generally United 
States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 692 n.18 (1998) (recognizing that silence cannot be used to 
substantiate a deportation claim); Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness:  Involuntary Testimony 
and Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 603 (1990) (ex-
plaining that the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in deportation pro-
ceedings in spite of their characterization as civil).  But see United States ex rel. Bilokumsky 
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923) (explaining that an alien’s “failure to claim that he was a 
citizen and his refusal to testify” about his citizenship “had a tendency to prove that he 
was an alien”).  The burden of proof applied is yet another example.  In general, the de-
fault standard of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence.  See Grogan v. 
Garner, 498 U.S. 278, 286 (1991).  However, the Supreme Court has required an inter-
mediate standard of proof in deportation cases between the civil preponderance standard 
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.  See Woodby 
v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the Government in such pro-
ceedings to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
ing evidence.” (emphasis added)); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) 
(“The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words 
‘clear,’ ‘cogent,’ ‘unequivocal,’ and ‘convincing,’ is less commonly used, but nonetheless 
‘is no stranger to the civil law.’  One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving 
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.  The in-
terests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money 
and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputa-
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The modern Court, at least until Padilla, has been steadfast in de-
scribing deportation proceedings as “purely civil” actions.101  Indeed, 
in many cases where respondents have attempted to assert rights 
commonly associated with criminal proceedings, courts have rejected 
the claim out of hand, based solely on the civil label without any fur-
ther analysis.102  It is, however, difficult to reconcile these cases with 
the contrasting phenomenon of the regular importation of certain 
criminal doctrinal strands into this purportedly purely civil realm.  In 
effect, the current state of the pre-Padilla doctrine was that deporta-
tion is purely and exclusively civil . . . except when it isn’t.  When we 
examine this doctrinal incoherence in the historical context of de-
portation precursors, which were explicitly recognized as criminal 
penalties,103 and in light of the Court’s repudiation of its only articu-
lated justification for the civil label104—the inherent powers theory—
what is revealed is the confused and indefensible state of the current 
jurisprudence regarding the nature of deportation. 
 
tion tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.  Similarly, this 
Court has used the ‘clear, unequivocal and convincing’ standard of proof to protect par-
ticularly important individual interests in various civil cases.” (citations omitted)); id. at 
432 (holding that a standard above preponderance of the evidence is necessary for civil 
commitment cases, though the term “unequivocal” is not constitutionally required in that 
context); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364–65 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
101 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. 
102 See Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining “the invitation to trans-
plant the categorical approach root and branch—without any modification whatever—
into the civil removal context”); Csekinek v. INS, 391 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 2004) (re-
jecting ex post facto argument because “[t]he Supreme Court has specifically held that 
immigration and deportation proceedings are civil, and not criminal, in nature”); Bilo-
kumsky, 263 U.S. at 157 (“And since deportation proceedings are in their nature civil, the 
rule excluding involuntary confessions could have no application”); Briseno v. INS, 192 
F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[D]eportation is not criminal punishment.”); Balsys, 
524 U.S. at 671 (“[R]isk that [resident alien’s] testimony might subject him to deporta-
tion is not a sufficient ground for asserting the privilege, given the civil character of a de-
portation proceeding.”); United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1991) (relying 
on the civil label in rejecting an ex post facto claim); Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (“[P]etitioner’s contentions that her deportation constitutes the infliction of 
double jeopardy and is a cruel and unusual punishment fail, among other reasons, under 
the principle so clear to judges, however difficult it may be for laymen to comprehend, 
that deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a 
civil rather than a criminal procedure.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Scheide-
mann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1520 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he prohibition against ex post fac-
to laws does not apply to deportation proceedings, which are purely civil . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
103 See discussion supra notes 36–44 (reviewing the role of deportation at common law and in 
the American colonies). 
104 See discussion supra Part I.B (reviewing the demise of the inherent powers theory). 
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II.  PADILLA:  A CLOSE READING. 
It was in the context of this tangled jurisprudence regarding the 
nature of deportation that the Court considered the case of Padilla.105  
The central issue in Padilla did not, however, necessarily require any 
examination of the civil or criminal nature of deportation proceed-
ings.  Padilla was a native of Honduras, an honorably discharged vet-
eran of the United States Army, and had been a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States for over forty years by the time his case 
reached the Supreme Court.106  In 2001, the tractor trailer Padilla was 
driving was stopped by police for a safety inspection, and he, thereaf-
ter, allegedly consented to a search of his vehicle.107  The search re-
vealed several styrofoam boxes containing approximately 1033 
pounds of marijuana.108  Padilla was charged with, inter alia, traffick-
ing in marijuana and ultimately pled guilty in return for a sentence of 
ten years, with five years to be served and five years to be probated.109  
However, Padilla alleges that he only pled guilty in reliance upon his 
attorney’s affirmative misadvice that he “did not have to worry about 
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”110 
In fact, Padilla’s conviction was an aggravated felony111 subjecting 
him to mandatory detention and deportation.112  In 2004, two years 
after his conviction, Padilla filed a pro se post-conviction motion 
seeking to withdraw his plea, asserting that he had received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, to wit:  being affirmatively misadvised about 
the immigration consequences of his plea agreement.113  The trial 
court denied the motion but was reversed by the Kentucky Court of 
 
105 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
106 Id. at 1477. 
107 Brief of Respondent at 2, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 
WL 2473880. 
108 Id. at 3. 
109 Id. at 3–4. 
110 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (defining drug trafficking as an aggravated felony). 
112 Conviction of an “aggravated felony,” defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006), includes 
a broad range of offenses including drug trafficking crimes, though ironically convictions 
need not be either aggravated or felonies to be classified as “aggravated felonies.”  Aggra-
vated felons are ineligible for “cancellation of removal,” the primary form of discretionary 
relief available to longtime residents, and therefore noncitizens like Padilla who commit 
aggravated felonies are subject to mandatory deportation.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) 
(2006) (excluding aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony from a class 
whose removal the Attorney General may cancel).  Section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) (2006), provides for the mandatory immigration detention of a large class of 
noncitizens who are subject to criminal convictions.  This includes all aggravated felons 
upon their release from criminal custody. 
113 Brief of Petitioner at 11, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). 
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Appeals.114  Ultimately, a divided Kentucky Supreme Court held that 
since deportation was a collateral, not direct, consequence of the 
criminal conviction, even affirmative misadvise did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment because “collateral consequences are outside the 
scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” 
and therefore it held “that counsel’s failure to advise Appellee of 
such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly pro-
vides no basis for relief.”115  The issue before the Supreme Court cen-
tered on the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a tra-
ditional criminal proceeding and thus did not necessarily require 
consideration of the criminal or civil nature of deportation proceed-
ings. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably, because of 
the division of lower court authority regarding the consequences of a 
criminal defense attorney’s misadvice or failure to advise a defendant 
about the immigration consequences of a contemplated plea agree-
ment.  The large majority of courts to consider the issue, including 
ten federal circuits and seventeen states, had held that a criminal de-
fense attorney’s failure to advise her clients of the immigration con-
sequences of a contemplated plea agreement is not ineffective assis-
tance.116  Three state courts had held to the contrary that, in at least 
 
114 Id. at 11–12. 
115 Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
116 See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2008); Yong Wong 
Park v. United States, 222 F. App’x 82 (2d Cir. 2007); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 
1257 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 
1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); Gumangan v. United States, 254 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Del Ro-
sario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1989), 
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit. V, § 505(b), 104 Stat. 5050, and cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1059 (1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 8 (4th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990, 
991 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 251 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 945 (1973); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Major v. 
State, 814 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 2002); Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ga. 1999); 
People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. 1991); Mott v. State, 407 N.W.2d 581, 583 
(Iowa 1987); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145, 1152 (Kan. 2002); Commonwealth v. Fuarta-
do, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110 (La. 2002); 
Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 579 (Minn. 1998); State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215, 224 
(Neb. 2002); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 1999); State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 
860, 864 (N.D. 1994); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93–94 (Pa. 1989); Niko-
laev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72, 77 (S.D. 2005); State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10–12, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651), 2009 WL 4933628 (discussing the issue of whether or not counsel’s nonad-
vice or misadvice about deportation violates the Sixth Amendment). 
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some situations, defense attorneys have an affirmative obligation to 
advise clients about immigration consequences.117  On the issue of af-
firmative misadvice, the great weight of authority went in the oppo-
site direction, with seventeen jurisdictions holding that misadvice 
about immigration consequences was ineffective assistance of coun-
sel118 and only one jurisdiction joining Kentucky to hold to the con-
trary.119  The Supreme Court had not commented directly on the is-
sue in the past though it had once suggested in dicta that, in light of 
the gravity of the consequence of deportation, defense attorneys 
should advise clients about immigration consequences.120 
 
117 See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1987) (holding that if a lawyer had enough 
information to believe the client was a noncitizen, effective assistance would require ad-
vising about collateral immigration consequences), rev’d on other grounds, 746 P.2d 523 
(Colo. 1987) (en banc); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004) (holding that an 
attorney must determine the defendant’s immigration status and specifically advise the 
defendant of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty); see also State v. Creary, 
No. 82767, 2004 WL 351878, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2004) (explaining that while 
defense lawyers ordinarily need not advise clients of collateral consequences including 
deportation, “an evolving sense of the lawyer’s duty indicates that such information 
should be given when it appears critical to the defendant’s situation” and finding that a 
lawyer’s failure to advise a client whom he knew to be interested in deportation conse-
quences can be ineffective); cf. Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. App. 1994) 
(reaching same result on state constitutional grounds); Gonzalez v. State, 134 P.3d 955, 
958–59 (Or. 2006) (same).  See generally Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors 
et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 116, at 12–13 (discussing the “evolving understandings 
of justice” as reflected by state court decisions that criminal defense lawyers must advise at 
least some noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of conviction). 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1016–18 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 
1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979); Djioev v. 
State, No. A-9158, 2006 WL 361540, at *2–3 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006); Alguno v. 
State, 892 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 
799 (Ga. 2004); People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ill. 1985); Rubio v. State, 194 P.3d 
1224, 1232 (Nev. 2008); State v. Garcia, 727 A.2d 97, 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); 
Creary, 2004 WL 351878, at *2; King v. State, No. M2006-02745-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 
3052854 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2007); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 934–35 
(Utah 2005); Commonwealth v. Tahmas, Nos. 105254, 105255, 2005 WL 2249587 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. July 26, 2005); Valle v. State, 132 P.3d 181, 184 (Wyo. 2006); see also In re Resendiz, 
19 P.3d 1171, 1177 (Cal. 2001) (stating that failing to advise or providing misadvice may 
be ineffective); People v. McDonald, 745 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) 
(same), aff’d, 802 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 2003). 
119 See United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (holding that 
the appellant “was not unfairly or unjustly treated” when trial judge refused to allow the 
appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty at the time he appeared for sentencing). 
120 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001) (“Even if the defendant were not initially 
aware of § 212(c), competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice 
guides, would have advised him concerning the provision’s importance.”).  See generally 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland standard to plea agree-
ments). 
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Before the Supreme Court, Kentucky relied primarily on the ar-
gument that deportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal 
conviction and on the great weight of authority holding that defense 
attorneys, like courts, are under no obligation to advise clients of col-
lateral consequence, including deportation.121  Kentucky argued that 
there is no principled distinction between deportation and other col-
lateral consequences and warned of the slippery slope of ever increas-
ing obligations of defense counsel.122  Padilla and his supporting amici 
made three primary arguments:  (1) because of dramatic changes in 
immigration law over the past twenty years, making deportation a vir-
tually automatic and certain result of many convictions, it is now a di-
rect, not collateral, consequence;123 (2) “deportation is different”—
even if deportation is a not a direct consequence it is a unique colla-
teral consequence because of its gravity and its close relationship to 
the criminal conviction;124 and (3) the collateral consequences doc-
trine is inapposite because it governs the Court’s obligation to insure 
that a plea is knowing and intelligent, but the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement of effective assistance of counsel is not so limited.125 
 
121 Brief of Respondent, supra note 107, at 18 (“Given the breadth and diversity of the con-
sequences noted, placing a duty on defense counsel to be aware and advise a defendant 
of any likely collateral consequences would be overly burdensome and wholly impractic-
al.”). 
122 Id. at 40 (“Attempting to treat deportation differently than other collateral matters will 
open the Pandora’s box of collateral matters that will have to be addressed individually by 
the courts, thereby further overburdening an overtaxed judicial system.”); see also Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 
S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223 (“[D]efense attorneys would be forced 
to investigate and answer complex legal questions in which they have little or no expertise 
or experience.”). 
123 Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 116, 
at 10, 18 (“Deportation is no longer a collateral consequence of conviction, as statutory 
changes over the last two decades have made it automatic upon conviction of certain 
crimes, with no discretionary relief. . . . Deportation is thus a direct rather than a collater-
al consequence of an aggravated-felony conviction.”); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113, 
at 3 (“Because of recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, a great 
number of criminal convictions now lead to the dire and inevitable consequence of de-
portation.”). 
124 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113, at 51 (“Immigration consequences for persons con-
victed are so severe in nature and so immediately and deeply interwoven with the crimi-
nal prosecution and sentence that effective assistance of counsel must extend to protect-
ing the accused against such consequences.”). 
125 Id. at 18–50 (arguing that the origin and rationale of the collateral consequences rule are 
inapposite to ineffective-assistance claims and that, in fact, they run afoul of Strickland); 
Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 26, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651) (“The Sixth Amend-
ment does not support a more rigid or formalistic conception of the attorney’s duties at 
the plea stage.”).  In the alternative, Padilla made the additional argument that even if no 
affirmative advice is required under the Sixth Amendment, misadvice still renders a con-
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Notably, for our purposes, the parties and amicus briefs were rife 
with discussions of the nature of removal proceedings.  For his part, 
Padilla argued “one can no longer draw distinct lines between crimi-
nal and immigration consequences.”126  Amici, criminal and immigra-
tion law professors argued that “[s]tatutory changes have broken 
down the walls between criminal and immigration proceed-
ings . . . .”127  Similarly, amicus Constitutional Accountability Center 
argued that “the line between penal and immigration consequences 
has been blurred . . . .”128  Kentucky’s argument relied to an even 
greater extent on assertions about the nature of removal proceed-
ings.  It argued that the “right to ‘counsel for his defence’ contem-
plates a criminal prosecution, not a civil proceeding,” that the “crim-
inal sentencing court has no authority or control over civil 
consequences arising from a criminal conviction,” and that, there-
fore, “the constitutional standard focuses on attorney competence in 
criminal cases, not civil or administrative cases.”129 
In its decision, the Court first spent considerable time chronicling 
the way immigration law has “changed dramatically over the last 90 
years” such that the “‘drastic measure’ of deportation or removal is 
now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of 
crimes.”130  The Court noted that for more than a century after the 
nation’s founding, there were no immigration bars related to crimi-
nal convictions and that “radical changes” in 1917 (two decades after 
the civil label was attached to deportation) led to the first American 
law providing for the deportation of people convicted of crimes after 
entry.131  The Court also noted that, for the majority of the twentieth 
century, criminal sentencing judges were empowered under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to enter binding judicial “rec-
ommendations” against deportation (“JRAD”) at the time they 
handed down criminal sentences, and that, therefore, mandatory de-
portation was not a feature of our immigration laws.132  In regard to 
 
viction constitutionally infirm.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113, at 55–60.  This was 
the position endorsed by the Solicitor General in her amicus brief. Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 122, at 25 (“[M]isadvice on immigration consequences can 
rise to the level of deficient performance under Strickland.”). 
126 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 113, at 53. 
127 Brief of Criminal and Immigration Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 116. 
128 Brief of Constitutional Accountability Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). 
129 Brief of Respondent, supra note 107, at 9, 39–40, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). 
130 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citation omitted). 
131 Id. at 1478–79. 
132 Id. at 1479–80. 
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JRAD, the Court spoke approvingly of a Second Circuit decision re-
cognizing a JRAD as “‘part of the sentencing’ process.”133  In light of 
the dramatic changes in deportation law over the twentieth century, 
the Court concluded that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part of the penalty that may be im-
posed on noncitizen defendants . . . .”134 
In Part II of its decision, the critical portion for our purposes, the 
Court considered the parties’ arguments regarding the direct or col-
lateral nature of immigration consequences.  In so doing, the Court 
waded into the forgotten debate about the civil or criminal nature of 
deportation.  It began by acknowledging the long line of precedent 
characterizing deportation as civil but critically felt the need to quali-
fy the label:  “We have long recognized that deportation is a particu-
larly severe ‘penalty,’ but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.  
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is never-
theless intimately related to the criminal process.”135  The Court recognized 
that over the last century: 
Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deporta-
tion for nearly a century.  And, importantly, recent changes in our immi-
gration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad 
class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we find it ‘most difficult’ to divorce 
the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.136 
The Court, therefore, concluded that “[d]eportation as a conse-
quence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to 
the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or 
a collateral consequence.”137 
Ultimately, this entire discussion is dicta because the Court re-
solved the case by adopting Padilla’s argument that the “collateral 
versus direct distinction is . . . ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim 
concerning the specific risk of deportation.”138  Instead the Court 
looked to Strickland’s reasonableness standard and adopted the mi-
nority position of lower courts:  that defense counsel has an affirma-
tive duty to investigate and advise noncitizen clients of the potential 
immigration consequences of a contemplated disposition—both si-
lence and affirmative misadvice are constitutionally deficient.139 
 
133 Id. at 1480 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir 1986)). 
134 Id. at 1481. 
135 Id. at 1483 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
136 Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)) (citation omitted). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1483.  When the law is clear about the deportation consequences for a client, as was 
the situation in Padilla’s case, the Court said that it is the criminal defense attorney’s 
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The holding of Padilla will require a healthy transformation of the 
defense bar’s vision of its role and responsibility and will considerably 
improve the measure of justice afforded to noncitizen defendants in 
our criminal justice system.  However, as I argue below, the Court’s 
discussion of the nature of removal proceedings and its ultimate con-
clusion that deportation is different, insofar as it cannot be classified 
as either a direct or collateral consequence—a proxy for the criminal 
and civil labels140—could be the most important legacy of the Padilla 
decision. 
III. PADILLA AS A CRITICAL PIVOT POINT IN IMMIGRATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In the incrementalist modality of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
the Padilla Court’s conclusion that deportation is “uniquely difficult 
to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence”141 could, in 
time, come to be understood as the beginning of a radical restructur-
ing of the Court’s conception of the civil or criminal nature of depor-
tation.  If the Court continues in this direction, Padilla will be unders-
tood as a pivot point in the Court’s immigration jurisprudence—
marking the first time in over a century that the Court has substan-
tively considered the civil or criminal nature of deportation.  As dis-
cussed below, there is good reason to be hopeful that an about-face is 
coming from the rule laid out in Fong Yue Ting:  that deportation 
proceedings are purely civil in nature.142  While ultimately dicta, Jus-
tice Stevens spent approximately half of the decision explaining how 
much has changed in immigration law since Fong Yue Ting and how 
these changes impact the nature of deportation.  What Justice Stevens 
 
clear “duty to give correct advice.” Id.  However, when the law is unclear or not 
straightforward, as the Court acknowledged is often the case, a criminal defense attorney 
only has to “advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences.” Id.  In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Ro-
berts, Justice Alito took the middle-ground approach largely adopted by a majority of 
lower courts, arguing that a defense attorney’s duty is to:  “(1) refrain from unreasonably 
providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may 
have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, 
the alien should consult an immigration attorney.” Id. at 1496 (Alito, J., concurring).  Jus-
tice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, would have adopted Kentucky’s extreme 
position and held that even affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences 
does not constitute ineffective assistance. Id. at 1500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Because the 
subject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled 
to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application.”). 
140 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
141 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
142 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1983). 
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describes is just the sort of change that can justify overruling long 
standing but outdated precedent.  Instead, Padilla suggests that the 
Court is moving toward a recognition that “deportation is differ-
ent”—it lives in the netherworld between civil and criminal proceed-
ings, not truly belonging to either. 
To attempt to predict the approaching arch of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence is, some would say, a fool’s errand, and all would proba-
bly agree is, at minimum, a difficult task and an imprecise art.  And 
indeed there has been, for some time, no shortage of lower courts,143 
dissenting judges,144 or scholars145 prodding the Court to reconsider its 
 
143 See, e.g., Fadiga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that al-
though the Sixth Amendment does not apply, “we cannot treat immigration proceedings 
like everyday civil proceedings . . . because unlike in everyday civil proceedings, the liber-
ty of an individual is at stake in deportation proceedings.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J. concurring) 
(“[T]here are many areas of federal law where [the criminal and civil] distinction be-
comes blurred.  Habeas corpus is one, civil forfeitures in conjunction with criminal pros-
ecutions is another, and immigration cases may well be a third.”); McLeod v. Peterson, 
283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960) (stating that deportation proceedings implicate “an especially 
critical and fundamental individual right”); Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 F. 833, 838 (D. 
Mass. 1915) (“To make the defendant’s substantial rights in a matter involving personal 
liberty [such as deportation proceedings] depend on whether the proceeding be called 
‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ seems to me unsound.”). 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Ad-
ministrative determinations of liability to deportation have been sustained as constitu-
tional only by considering them to be exclusively civil in nature, with no criminal conse-
quences or connotations.  That doctrine, early adopted against sharp dissent has been 
adhered to with increasing logical difficulty as new causes for deportation, based not on 
illegal entry but on conduct after admittance, have been added, and the period within 
which deportation proceedings may be instituted has been extended.”); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Banishment is punish-
ment in the practical sense.  It may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life 
worth while.”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 737–38 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Banishment 
may be resorted to as punishment for crime, but among the powers reserved to the 
people and not delegated to the government is that of determining whether whole classes 
in our midst shall, for no crime but that of their race and birthplace, be driven from our 
territory.”). 
145 See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 28, at 1931–35 (discussing the problematic lack of a com-
prehensive theoretical approach in the field of immigration law in general and deporta-
tion law in particular); Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable 
in Adversarial Administrative Deportation Proceedings:  Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules 
of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 113–16 (2007) (noting the reasons to consider depor-
tation proceedings as criminal proceedings rather than as civil proceedings); Legomsky, 
supra note 28, at 512 (“The now prolific case law dismissing deportation as civil rather 
than criminal or otherwise punitive is long on citation of precedent and short on inde-
pendent reasoning.”); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 327–41 (discussing the need to create a 
new model for explaining the boundary between civil and criminal proceedings and the 
Supreme Court’s response to this need); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others:  Legal 
Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1780, 1786 (2010) (“There are 
many obstacles that stand between the status quo and a just immigration policy.”); Pauw, 
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conception of deportation proceedings.  What then provides hope 
that the Court will now be moved to action?  A close reading of the 
language used by the Court in Padilla and its contrast with other re-
cent Supreme Court pronouncements, an examination of trends in 
the Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence, a survey of public 
perception linking criminal and immigration law, and the opportuni-
ty to remedy the incoherent state of doctrine, together, I argue, pro-
vide good reason to believe change is coming. 
A. Putting Padilla’s Pronouncements in Context:  Contrasting Past Supreme 
Court Statements and Understanding the Link Between the Civil-Criminal 
and the Collateral-Direct Divides 
To many, the Court’s description of the intimate link between de-
portation and criminal law will seem completely unsurprising.  In-
deed, these concepts generally mirror public perception.146  However, 
to students of the Court’s immigration jurisprudence, it was startling 
(and refreshing) to read these common sense pronouncements be-
cause of how sharply they contrast with prior Supreme Court state-
ments.  In Lopez-Mendoza, for example, Justice O’Connor emphatically 
declared that a “deportation proceeding is a purely civil action . . . .”147  
This language echoes early statements calling deportation “exclusively” 
and “only”148 civil and noting that the Court has “consistently classified 
[deportation] as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”149  Justice 
 
supra note 28, at 319–45 (asserting the need for the execessive punishment inflicted by 
deportation to be limited by the same constitutional provisions that are applied in other 
contexts); Stumpf, supra note 32 (proposing “a new approach to immigration sanctions 
based on the graduated penalty system in the criminal realm”); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact 
or Fiction:  The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 
82–89 (2010) (discussing removal as a criminal sanction and assessing whether it is an ef-
fective and appropriate punishment for crime). 
146 See discussion infra Part III.I.C. 
147 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (emphasis added). 
148 Spector, 343 U.S. at 178–79 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (describing Su-
preme Court precedent). 
149 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).  There was a period in the mid-twentieth 
century when the Supreme Court did exhibit some unease with the civil label’s applica-
tion to deportation proceedings.  See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (charac-
terizing the rule that deportation is not penal as “highly fictional”); Galvan v. Press, 347 
U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (explaining that if the Court were “writing on a clean slate . . . it 
might fairly be said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to puni-
tive legislation, should be applied to deportation”); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594 (characte-
rizing the civil designation of deportation “debatable”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 
223, 231 (1951) (describing the “grave nature of deportation”); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 
333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (describing deportation as a “drastic measure”); Delgadillo v. Car-
michael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (drawing attention to the “high and momentous” 
stakes in deportation proceedings); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (“That 
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O’Connor’s oft-quoted pronouncement about the “purely” civil na-
ture of deportation has, for a quarter century, been understood by 
lower courts as a clear signal not to venture into the criminal-civil de-
bate.150  As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
[W]hether an alien will be removed is still up to the INS.  There is a 
process to go through, and it is wholly independent of the court impos-
ing sentence.  The Supreme Court has made this clear by describing de-
portation as a ‘purely civil action’ separate and distinct from a criminal 
proceeding.  Removal is not part of the sentence; future immigration 
consequences do not bear on the ‘range of the defendant’s punishment’ 
imposed by the court, and deportation is not punishment for the 
crime.151 
We would expect that the Padilla Court’s conclusion that “deporta-
tion is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important 
part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants 
who plead guilty”152 should alter the Ninth Circuit’s, and other 
courts’, understanding of the nature of deportation. 
However, despite its musing about the civil or criminal nature of 
deportation, the Court’s ultimate conclusion was, on its face, about 
the facially distinct direct or collateral designation—
“Deportation . . . is . . . uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct 
or a collateral consequence.”153  To understand the import of this 
statement for the civil-criminal debate, we must understand some-
thing about the connection between these two doctrinal strands—the 
civil-criminal divide and the collateral consequences doctrine.  Be-
cause of the intimate connection between the two doctrines, and in-
deed because the Padilla Court made this connection explicit, we can 
understand the Court’s inability to classify deportation as direct or 
collateral as a proxy for—or at minimum strongly suggesting—a simi-
 
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”); see also 
Markowitz, supra note 7, at 298–307 (discussing the evolution of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding the civil label). 
150 See, e.g., Csekinek v. INS, 391 F.3d 819, 824 (6th Cir. 2004) (referring to deportation pro-
ceedings as civil rather than criminal in nature, in light of Supreme Court holdings); Ca-
det v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2004); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 723 (6th 
Cir. 2003); De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Drummond, 
240 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Avila-Gonzalez, No. 98-1391, 
1999 WL 1037572, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1999); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 
1520 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996); Sene v. INS, No. 95-3104, 1996 WL 667906, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 
19, 1996); United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 31–32 (1st Cir. 1991); Maldonado-Perez v. 
INS, 865 F.2d 328, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
151 Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d at 516 (citations omitted) (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 
1038). 
152 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
153 Id. at 1482. 
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lar conclusion that deportation is neither purely civil, nor purely 
criminal, in nature. 
The collateral consequences doctrine is a creation of the lower 
courts attempting to define the scope of the Supreme Court’s pro-
nouncement that “a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made 
voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the 
consequences.”154  As the Third Circuit explained: 
It has been stated broadly that out of just consideration for persons ac-
cused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be ac-
cepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full under-
standing of the consequences.  But the pertinent question is:  what 
consequences?  To hold that no valid sentence of conviction can be en-
tered under a plea of guilty unless the defendant is first apprised of all 
collateral legal consequences of the conviction would result in a mass ex-
odus from the federal penitentiaries.155 
Accordingly, lower courts developed the rule that, before a defendant 
pleads guilty to a crime, he must first be appraised of the direct, but 
not the collateral, consequences of his plea in order to ensure that he 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights in accordance with due 
process.156 
The case commonly cited as the origin of the doctrine is United 
States v. Parrino,157 which specifically considered whether a defendant 
must be warned that a guilty plea could subject him to deportation.  
In Parrino the Second Circuit determined, without discussion, that 
deportation is a “collateral consequence of conviction” and, with sub-
stantial discussion, concluded that “the finality of a conviction on a 
plea of guilty” does not depend “upon a contemporaneous realiza-
tion by the defendant of the collateral consequences thereof.”158  The 
collateral consequences doctrine has since been adopted by every 
other circuit court of appeals.159 
 
154 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). 
155 United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963) (citation omitted). 
156 Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) (reiterating the “long-standing 
rule in this as well as other circuits that the trial judge when accepting a plea of guilty is 
not bound to inquire whether a defendant is aware of the collateral effects of his plea”); 
Cariola, 323 F.2d at 186 (“[T]he factual situations which have occasioned the [plea of 
guilty] afford no basis for holding that the finality of a conviction depends upon a con-
temporaneous realization by the defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea.”); 
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (codifying the rule). 
157 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954). 
158 Id. at 921–22. 
159 See, e.g., Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); Duke v. Cockrell, 292 F.3d 414, 
417 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2002); El-
Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 
236 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292–93 (7th Cir. 1989); 
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While the Supreme Court has never itself explicitly adopted the 
doctrine, its statement in Brady v. United States that “[t]he standard as 
to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that . . . ‘[a] 
plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences,’”160 has been interpreted by some lower courts as an affir-
mance of the collateral consequences doctrine.161  The Supreme 
Court has never, however, articulated any standard to distinguish col-
lateral from direct consequences and, in fact, in Padilla recognized 
divergent standards employed by the lower courts for that purpose.162  
One thing that all courts seem to agree upon, however, is the close 
link between the determination of whether a consequence is collater-
al and whether it is civil.163  The link is so close, in fact, that some 
 
Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-
Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 
1984); Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365–66 (4th Cir. 1973); Unit-
ed States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
160 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc)). 
161 See, e.g., Sambro, 454 F.2d at 922 (“We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said 
when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.”). 
162 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 n.8 (2010) (“There is some disagreement 
among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and collateral consequences.”); 
id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (acknowledging that “the line between ‘direct’ and ‘col-
lateral’ consequences is not always clear”).  Compare, Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366 (“The dis-
tinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded 
in the relevant decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate 
and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”), with Torrey, 
842 F.2d at 236 (“[T]he determination that a particular consequence is ‘collater-
al’ . . . rest[s] on the fact that it was in the hands of another government agency or in the 
hands of the defendant himself.”), and United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 
2000) (“However ‘automatically’ Gonzalez’s deportation—or administrative detention—
might follow from his conviction, it remains beyond the control and responsibility of the 
district court in which that conviction was entered and it thus remains a collateral conse-
quence thereof.”). 
163 See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convic-
tions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 687 
(2006) (“[A]ppellate courts . . . hold that neither defense attorneys nor trial courts are 
required to inform defendants of these consequences as part of the guilty plea or sen-
tencing process.  As a result, the non-criminal nature of these consequences separates 
them from the criminal punishment imposed upon the defendant.”); Sweeney, supra note 
145, at 52 (stating that courts have generally found defendants “to be entitled to the con-
stitutional protections of criminal proceedings only when they have found a consequence 
of conviction to be punitive (rather than remedial) in nature and the direct (rather than 
collateral) consequence of the conviction”); see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively 
Bliss:  Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 119, 194 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should breach the distinction be-
tween direct and collateral); Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Crim-
inal Convictions in American Courts:  The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 146 
(2008) (finding that collateral consequences are often discussed in courtrooms but to a 
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courts treat them as a singular inquiry.164  Even when courts purport 
to impose some other standard, such standards are almost always, in 
practice, mere proxies for the civil label.165  Thus, courts tend to use 
the term “collateral consequence” as synonymous with “civil conse-
quence” and, practically, there is rarely any daylight between the two 
determinations.166  The Padilla Court itself conflates the discussion of 
the criminal-civil nature of deportation with the collateral-direct de-
 
widely varying and uncertain extent); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral 
and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 689 (2008) (describing the framework applied by the 
lower courts in determining whether a consequence is direct or collateral). 
164 See, e.g., United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that deporta-
tion is a collateral consequence because it “is a civil proceeding which may result from a 
criminal prosecution, but is not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding.”); 
Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1367 (holding that post-conviction civil commitment is collateral be-
cause it is “not imposed in the nature of punishment; it results from a civil, not a criminal 
proceeding”); Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that 
even automatic consequences are collateral if they are “remedial and civil rather than 
punitive”). 
165 See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating the 
rule “limit[ing] the direct consequences of a guilty plea to the immediate and automatic 
consequences of that plea” and yet holding that “regardless of certainty, deportation is a col-
lateral consequence of a guilty plea” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 515–16 (9th Cir. 
2002) (formulating the inquiry into whether “the consequence is contingent upon action 
taken by an individual or individuals other than the sentencing court” but also relying on 
the Supreme Court’s statements that deportation is a purely civil action that is not pu-
nishment for a crime); Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 27 (inquiring whether the consequence is 
imposed by an agency “beyond the control and responsibility” of the court in which that 
conviction was entered, which because of double jeopardy limits means only civil conse-
quence can be collateral). 
166 See generally United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980) (explaining that a pro-
ceeding is criminal if the legislature designates it as such, or, if labeled by the legislature 
as civil, it will nonetheless be deemed criminal if the penalty is so punitive in nature as to 
overcome the legislature’s intent); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 
(1963) (setting forth the following factors to evaluate the punitive nature of a proceed-
ing:  (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint[;]” (2) 
“whether it has historically been regarded as punishment[;]” (3) “whether it comes into 
play only upon finding of scienter[;]” (4) “whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence[;]” (5) “whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime[;]” (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it[;]” and (7) “whether it appears excessive in re-
lation to the alternative purpose assigned”); Markowitz, supra note 7, at 327–32 (applying 
the modern civil-criminal divide test to deportation).  There are a few minor exceptions 
to this rule but they do not alter the analysis significantly.  See, e.g., Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 
at 516 (reemphasizing the connection between the collateral consequences doctrine and 
the criminal-civil divide by explaining that the statutes at issue in Littlejohn, unlike the sta-
tutes governing deportation, are part of the criminal code); United States v. Littlejohn, 
224 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the civil sanction of ineligibility for feder-
al benefits—such as food stamps and social security—was a direct consequence because 
“these sections automatically affect the range of [the defendant’s] punishment”). 
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signation, moving back and forth between discussing the two without 
distinction.167  Thus, when we evaluate the Court’s pronouncements 
in Padilla against this backdrop regarding the collateral consequences 
doctrine and contrast the pronouncements with prior statements of 
the Court declaring the “purely” civil nature of deportation, the im-
port and significance of the decision for our understanding of the 
fundamental nature of deportation begins to come into view. 
B. Trends in the Supreme Court’s Immigration Jurisprudence:  Crescendoing 
Discomfort with the Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Norms 
Notwithstanding the dramatic statements in Padilla and the sharp 
divergence from prior Supreme Court characterizations of deporta-
tion, the Court’s discussion remains dicta and such singular state-
ments in dicta are not alone sufficient to indicate a sea of change in 
immigration jurisprudence.  However, when viewed together with 
other significant trends in Supreme Court immigration jurispru-
dence, a clearer picture of the forthcoming evolution of the Court’s 
conception of deportation comes into focus.  Specifically, a review of 
the immigration cases decided by the Court over the last two decades 
reveals a surprising trend that, together with Padilla, evince the 
Court’s crescendoing discomfort with the asymmetric incorporation 
of criminal justice norms into deportation proceedings and thus gives 
us further reason to believe the Court may be prepared to reconcep-
tualize the nature of deportation proceedings. 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have been described as the 
most conservative Supreme Courts in the history of the United 
States.168  Empirical data bears out these characterizations.169  The 
 
167 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (acknowledging the difficulty of applying the direct-
collateral distinction to deportation). 
168 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 405 (2004) (“The Rehnquist Court is widely 
believed to be the most conservative Court in recent memory.  Especially in the legal 
academy, the Rehnquist Court has a reputation as being conservative in its politics, origi-
nalist in its interpretive commitments, and suspicious of the New Deal.”); Michael Vitiel-
lo, Liberal Bias in the Legal Academy:  Overstated and Undervalued, 77 MISS. L.J. 507, 565 
(2007) (“[F]ew can deny that [the Roberts Court] is one of the most conservative Courts 
in modern history.”). 
169 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:  A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 782 tbl.3 (2009) (ranking Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Roberts, Alito, O’Connor, and Kennedy as among the ten most conservative justic-
es to serve since 1937); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html 
(analyzing data from multiple empirical studies and databases that track Supreme Court 
voting and reporting that “the Roberts [C]ourt has staked out territory to the right of the 
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Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have, in general, been hostile to civil 
liberties and civil rights claims and, in particular, to the rights of po-
litically disfavored groups.170  Accordingly, one would expect that 
claims advancing immigrants’ rights would not have fared well before 
these conservative courts.  To the contrary, however, the Court has 
often surprised everyone by handing down unexpected and resound-
ing victories on behalf of immigrants.171  Moreover, many of these vic-
tories were lopsided wins, with immigrants garnering significant sup-
port from the Court’s conservative voting block.172 
 
two conservative [C]ourts that immediately preceded it”).  See generally Lee Esptein, Tho-
mas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson & Jason Roberts, The U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices Database, N.W. L. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/
research/justicesdata.html (providing raw data on individual Justices’ voting patterns). 
170 See Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold:  Pursuing Failure-to-Protect Claims Under State Constitu-
tions Via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1329 (2010) (noting the 
“sharp curtailment in the national interpretation and application of civil liberties” under 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Be-
came the Law of the Land:  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and 
the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076 (2010) (arguing that recent 
Courts have “afforded vast discretion to law enforcement” in ways that have “exacerbated 
problems with racial profiling”); Landes & Posner, supra note 169 (indicating the high 
conservative voting rates of the majorities of the Rehquist and Roberts Courts on civil li-
berties cases); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Decision-Making Trends of the 
Rehnquist Court Era:  Civil Rights and Liberties Cases, 89 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (2005) (find-
ing that the Rehnquist Court handed down conservative decisions rejecting individual 
claims in the majority of civil liberties cases). 
171 See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (rejecting the well-established majority view that failure 
to advise regarding immigration consequences of a conviction does not constitute inef-
fective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment); Lopez v. Gonzales, 
549 U.S. 47, 59–60 (2006) (adopting the minority view of the circuits to hold that state fe-
lony drug offenses are not necessarily aggravated felonies under immigration law); INS v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324–26 (2001) (refusing to apply retroactivity to numerous statutory 
provisions stripping immigration judges of discretion to grant relief and federal courts of 
judicial review over deportation orders, despite contrary agency interpretations); Zadvy-
das v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700–02 (2001) (adopting the minority position of lower courts 
to hold that immigration officials may not indefinitely detain an immigrant ordered de-
ported). 
172 See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding unanimously in 
favor of the immigrant, with Justices Alito and Thomas concurring in the judgment); Pa-
dilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477, 1487 (resolving the decision 7–2 in favor of the immigrant, with 
the concurrence also adopting the minority position that counsel has a duty to advise but 
framing that duty to advise more narrowly than the Court); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 
827, 830 (2010) (finding unanimously in favor of the immigrant, with Justice Alito con-
curring in the judgment); Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1753, 1762 (2009) (deciding 
the question 7–2, and reflecting clear concern over the quality of justice in removal pro-
ceedings and the error-correcting role played by federal courts); Flores-Figueroa v. Unit-
ed States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888, 1894 (2009) (holding unanimously in favor of the immi-
grant, with Justices Scalia and Thomas and Justice Alito separately concurring in part and 
in the judgment; the Justices were unanimously troubled by the aggressive interpretation 
of the immigration-related criminal statute at issue); Lopez, 549 U.S. at 50, 60 (resolving 
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In order to systematically evaluate the Court’s approach to immi-
gration cases, I reviewed all immigration cases decided by both the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.173  To hone in on the level of the 
 
the decision 8–1, with Justice Thomas dissenting); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3 (2004) 
(holding unanimously in favor of the immigrant). 
173 I defined immigration cases as direct appeals from removal orders and appeals of habeas 
petitions related to the detention of respondents in removal proceedings.  There were 
twenty-five such cases.  See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589 (2010) 
(win, determining that defendant’s second Texas offense of simple drug possession was 
not “aggravated felony,” so as to preclude cancellation of removal, where second convic-
tion was not based on fact of prior conviction); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010) 
(win, finding that provision of the Illegal Immigrantion Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act (“IIRIRA”), limiting court’s authority to review any action of the Attorney 
General the authority for which was specified under the Act to be within his discretion, 
did not apply to preclude judicial review of the BIA order); Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
1159, 1163 (2009) (win, pointing out that the BIA must interpret the statute barring an 
alien from obtaining refugee status while at the same time considering whether an alien 
is compelled to assist in persecution); Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (loss, 
holding that clear and convincing evidence supported finding that the loss resulting from 
defendant’s offenses was greater than $10,000); Nken, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (win, ruling that 
traditional stay factors governed a court of appeals’ authority to stay an alien’s removal 
pending judicial review, as opposed to the more demanding standard of the INA); Dada 
v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008) (win, holding that an alien must be permitted an opportu-
nity to withdraw a motion for voluntary departure, provided that such a request is made 
before the expiration of the departure period); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 
194 (2007) (loss, finding that a “theft offense,” for which alien may be removed, includes 
the crime of “aiding and abetting,” a theft offense); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 
U.S. 30 (2006) (loss, holding that the INA provision for reinstatement of removal orders 
against aliens illegally re-entering the United States also applied to aliens who re-entered 
the United States before IIRIRA effective date); Lopez, 549 U.S. 47 (win, determining that 
an alien was not disqualified from discretionary cancellation of removal for conduct that 
is a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (win, finding that the INA time limit, 
for how long the government may detain aliens who have been found removable or who 
have been  deemed inadmissible, can be stretched to that reasonably necessary to effect 
removal); Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (loss, ruling 
that Somalia’s inability to consent in advance to alien’s removal did not preclude his re-
moval to Somalia as country of his birth); Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10–12 (win, holding that ab-
rogating alien’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) and caus-
ing serious bodily injury in an accident in violation of Florida law was not a “crime of 
violence” and therefore was not an “aggravated felony” warranting deportation); Demore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (loss, deciding that the detention of an alien pursuant to no-
bail provision of INA did not violate his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 
because Congress was justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who were not 
detained would continue to engage in criminal activities and fail to appear for their re-
moval hearings); Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (loss, upholding statute 
making it more difficult for children who are born abroad and out of wedlock to one 
United States parent to claim citizenship through that parent if the citizen parent was the 
father); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (loss, determining that Court of 
Appeals lacked jurisdiction for review of final orders of removal, but jurisdiction-stripping 
provision of IIRIRA did not preclude aliens, who had been found removable based on 
their prior aggravated felony convictions, from filing habeas petitions in district court); 
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Court’s discomfort with the lack of criminal protection afforded to 
 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289 (win, holding that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) and IIRIRA did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review alien’s habeas 
petition, and provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA repealing discretionary relief from depor-
tation did not apply retroactively to alien who pled guilty to sale of controlled substance 
prior to statutes’ enactment); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at (win, finding that (1) INA’s post-
removal-period detention provision contains implicit reasonableness limitation; (2) fed-
eral habeas statute grants federal courts authority to decide whether given post-removal-
period detention is statutorily authorized; and (3) presumptive limit to reasonable dura-
tion of post-removal-period detention is six months); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 
(1999) (loss, deciding that statute making alien who has committed serious nonpolitical 
crime ineligible for withholding of deportation on ground that he would be subject to 
persecution did not require balancing alien’s criminal acts against the risk of persecution 
he would face if returned to his home country); INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 
(1996) (loss, finding that the Attorney General could consider acts of fraud committed by 
an alien in connection with his entry into the United States when deciding whether to 
grant a discretionary waiver of deportation); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) (loss, 
holding that a timely motion for reconsideration of a BIA decision does not toll the run-
ning of the ninety-day period for review of final deportation orders); Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292 (1993) (loss, ruling that a regulation permitting detained juvenile aliens to be 
released only to their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians, except in unusual and 
compelling circumstances, does not facially violate substantive due process); INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (loss, determining that a guerrilla organization’s at-
tempt to conscript a Guatemalan native into its military forces did not necessarily consti-
tute “persecution on account of political opinion” within meaning of statute permitting 
asylum if alien is unable or unwilling to return to home); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 
(1991) (loss, holding that administrative deportation proceedings are not adversary adju-
dications under section for which the EAJA waives sovereign immunity and authorizes 
award of attorney fees and costs); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (loss, finding that the 
abuse of discretion standard applies to the review of a BIA decision denying a motion to 
reopen deportation proceedings on ground that alien had not reasonably explained his 
failure to assert his asylum claim at outset); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 
(1987) (win, holding that in order to show “well-founded fear of persecution,” an alien 
seeking asylum need not prove that it is “more likely than not” that he or she will be per-
secuted in his or her own country).  The value of the findings set forth below, see infra 
notes 176–91 and accompanying text, are obviously limited by the relatively modest sam-
ple size of the study but this comprehensive review of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 
immigration jurisprudence is the best available data for the purpose.  Ironically, this defi-
nition does not capture the Padilla case itself.  In addition to the Padilla cases, there are a 
handful criminal-type appeals and affirmative lawsuits that are potentially also relevant to 
the analysis.  As discussed infra notes 176, 183, 185, the inclusion or exclusion of these 
cases does not affect the analysis.  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (presenting a criminal-
type appeal related to deportation); United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213 (2009) 
(same); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (defining ex-
clusive jurisdiction clause of IIRIRA, illustrating an affirmative lawsuit related to deporta-
tion); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (upholding the President’s 
power to order Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens intercepted on the high 
seas, exemplifying an affirmative lawsuit about immigration enforcement policy); INS v. 
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) (upholding the Attorney General’s 
broad powers, exemplifying another affirmative lawsuit related to deportation); United 
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (presenting a criminal-type appeal related 
to deportation). 
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immigrants, I then compared the win rate of immigrants to the win 
rate of criminal defendants.  I chose this comparison because crimi-
nal defendants are a likewise politically disfavored class of litigants, 
but there is, of course, no asymmetry insofar as criminal enforcement 
norms are utilized but constitutional criminal protections are also af-
forded.  Admittedly, the comparison remains a somewhat blunt in-
strument to assess the Court’s discomfort with the current characteri-
zation of removal proceedings.  But this data is used here only to 
round out the picture—to supplement the analysis of the plain lan-
guage in Padilla and the other factors set forth below.174 
Absent the lack of asymmetry in deportation proceedings, one 
would expect to find relatively similar treatment of criminal defen-
dants and immigrants facing deportation from the conservative 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.175  In fact, we find that immigrants 
fared significantly better than criminal defendants with immigrants 
prevailing in 48%176 of immigration cases and criminal defendants 
prevailing only 40%177 of the time.  While this disparity is significant, 
 
174 See discussion infra Part III.A, I.C–I.D. 
175 One could challenge this assumption and hypothesize that the disparate win rate dis-
cussed below, see discussion infra notes 176–91, are in fact attributable to other factors in-
cluding, for example, the greater political disfavor accorded to criminal defendants.  
However, such explanations do little to explain the trend in immigrant win rate discussed 
infra notes 176–91. 
176 Immigrants prevailed in twelve of the twenty-five cases.  See discussion supra note 173.  If 
we include the criminal-type appeals, this percentage raises to 53% (15/28), and if we in-
clude the affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings as well, the percentage 
remains unchanged at 48% (15/31). 
177 Defendants won 157 of 394 cases before the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  See Christo-
pher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1995–96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (finding a defendant win rate of 35%); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal 
Justice and the 1996–97 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29, 33 (1997) (find-
ing a defendant win rate of 30%); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1997–98 
U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 443, 445 (1999) (finding a defendant win rate of 
37%); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1998–99 U. S. Supreme Court Term, 9 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 23, 28 (1999) (finding a defendant win rate of 41%); Christopher E. 
Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1999–2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 77 N.D. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2001) (finding a defendant win rate of 39%); Christopher E. Smith & Steven B. Dow, 
Criminal Justice and the 2000–2001 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 
193 (2002) (finding a defendant win rate of 40%); Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist 
Court and Criminal Justice:  An Empirical Assessment, 19 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUSTICE 161, 
170 (2003) (aggregating the results of the preceding studies); Christopher E. Smith & 
Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2001–02 United States Supreme Court Term, 2003 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 417 (2003) (finding a defendant win rate of 33%); Christopher E. 
Smith & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2002–2003 United States Supreme Court 
Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859, 863–64 (2004) (finding a defendant win rate of 36%); Chris-
topher E. Smith, Michael McCall & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2003–2004 
United States Supreme Court Term, 35 N.M. L. REV. 123, 127 (2005) (finding a defendant win 
rate of 46%); Christopher E. Smith, Michael McCall & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice 
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it is not alone extraordinary and is potentially explained by factors 
other than the asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice norms in 
deportation proceedings.178 
However, the most important finding is not the overall win rate 
but rather the dramatic trend over time.  Over the life of the Rehn-
quist and Roberts Court we have seen the steady growth of the crim-
migration crisis.179  As Professor Legomsky describes it, “[s]tarting ap-
proximately twenty years ago, and accelerating today, a clear trend 
has come to define modern immigration law.  Sometimes dubbed 
‘criminalization,’ the trend has been to import criminal justice norms 
into a domain built upon a theory of civil regulation.”180  Accordingly, 
to the extent that this asymmetry is reflected in the win rate of immi-
grants, we would expect to see the immigrant win rate rising together 
with the increasing criminalization of immigration law.  This is pre-
cisely the trend revealed by the data while, in contrast, criminal de-
fendants’ win rates stayed relatively stagnant. 
While there have been a number of significant events marking the 
increased criminalization of immigration law, all pale in comparison 
to the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).181  Accordingly, I organized the da-
 
and the 2004–2005 United States Supreme Court Term, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 951, 957 (2006) 
(finding a defendant win rate of 47%); Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Mad-
havi M. McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2005–2006 United States Supreme Court Term, 25 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 495, 499 (2007) (finding a defendant win rate of 43%); Michael A. 
McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2006–2007 
United States Supreme Court Term, 76 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 993, 995–96 (2008) (finding a de-
fendant win rate of 36%); Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. 
Smith, Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007–2008 Term, 36 S.U. L. REV. 33, 38 
(2008) (finding a defendant win rate of 50%); Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. McCall & 
Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term, 29 
MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010) (finding a defendant win rate of 39%).  Data for the 2009 
term is not yet available and thus has not been included. 
178 See discussion supra note 175. 
179 See generally Stumpf, supra note 64 (discussing the criminalization of immigration law, or 
“crimmigration law”). 
180 Legomsky, supra note 28, at 469. 
181 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-590 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006)).  See Lau-
ra S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic Immigration Law and 
International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 988 (2002) (stating that under IIRIRA, 
“immigration penalties for criminality have been greatly enhanced, contributing to the 
criminalization of immigration law”); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000) 
(outlining the effects of the IIRIRA on lawful permanent U.S. residents); Helen Morris, 
Zero Tolerance:  The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1317, 1317 (1997) (“Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) and [IIRIRA] added to the laundry list of ‘aggravated felonies,’ which effective-
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ta into three periods:  (1) Rehnquist Court pre-IIRIRA immigration 
cases; (2) Rehnquist Court post-IIRIRA immigration cases; and (3) 
Roberts Court immigration cases.182  The change in immigrant win 
rate over these periods is dramatic.  During the Rehnquist Court pre-
IIRIRA period, before the explosion in the criminalization of immi-
gration law, immigrants won only 14% of the time.183  This, interes-
tingly, was well below the criminal defendant win rate of 33% for the 
same period.184  Since IIRIRA, however, along with the dramatic cri-
minalization of immigration law, immigrants’ win rate drastically in-
creased to 61%,185 well above the 41% win rate for criminal defen-
dants during that same period.186  When we parse the post-IIRIRA rate 
even further we see that the upward trend in immigrant wins contin-
ued as the criminalization of immigration law continued post-
IIRIRA.187  While immigrants won an impressive 57%188 of their cases 
 
ly preclude non-U.S. citizens from eligibility for almost every form of immigration re-
lief.”). 
182 The Rehnquist Court pre-IIRIRA immigration cases include all immigration cases, de-
fined supra note 173, decided by the Court between the 1987–88 term and the 1996–97 
term.  The Rehnquist Court post-IIRIRA immigration cases include all immigration cases 
decided by the Court between the 1997–98 and the 2004–05 term.  The Roberts Court 
immigration cases include all immigration cases decided by the Court from the 2005–06 
term through the present. 
183 Immigrants prevailed in only one of the seven cases heard during this period.  See discus-
sion supra note 173.  If we include the criminal-type appeals, this percentage raises to 
25% (2/8), and if we include the affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings 
as well, immigrants won 20% (2/10) of the time.  See id. 
184 See Criminal Justice and the 1995–96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra note 177 (finding a de-
fendant win rate of 34.6%); Criminal Justice and the 1996–97 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra 
note 177 (finding a defendant win rate of 30%).  Unfortunately, the available data for the 
pre-IIRIRA Rehnquist Court’s criminal justices cases are limited to only two terms (1995–
96 and 1996–97).  Accordingly, the data for this period is very incomplete, which could 
explain why this is the only period that shows any significant deviation from the 40% win 
rate that criminal defendants enjoyed during all other periods considered. 
185 Immigrants prevailed in eleven of the eighteen cases heard during this period.  See cases 
cited supra note 173.  If we include the criminal-type appeals, this percentage rises to 65% 
(13/20), and if we include the affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings as 
well, immigrants won 62% (13/21) of the time. 
186 Post-IIRIRA defendants won 140 of 342 cases.  See sources cited supra note 177. 
187 Significant post-IIRIRA events include:  increased use of local police to enforce immigra-
tion laws, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (authorizing agreements with states and lo-
calities to deputize non-federal agents to perform the functions of federal immigration 
enforcement officials); increased use of criminal enforcement tactics in enforcing civil 
immigration law violations, such as SWAT-style home raids, see CHIU ET AL., supra note 98, 
at 1–6 (analyzing the constitutional violations occurring during home raids by the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (“ICE”)); a program whereby civil immi-
gration information was entered into the FBI’s principal criminal database, see Complaint 
at 1, Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Ashcroft, 468 F. Supp. 2d 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 03-
CV-6324) (alleging on personal knowledge that government agencies have, without lawful 
authority, begun entering civil immigration information into the FBI’s principal crime 
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during the Rehnquist Court post-IIRIRA period,189 their win rate con-
tinued to increase thereafter with immigrants prevailing in 63%190 of 
cases before the Roberts Court.  When viewed in comparison to crim-
inal defendants, who only prevailed 43% of the time before the Ro-
berts Court, the immigrant win rate is startling.191  It is also notable 
that, over these periods, while immigrants’ fortunes were improving 
the Court overall was moving consistently to the right.192  Ultimately, 
what the data reveals is that not only have immigrants fared relatively 
well overall before these conservative Courts, as compared to criminal 
defendants, but that immigrants’ fortunes made dramatic and consis-
tent gains tracking the dramatic and consistent criminalization of 
immigration law.193  The correlating crescendoing trends, when 
 
database); the “Secure Communities” program, in which information from state and local 
police bookings is electronically forwarded to federal immigration enforcement officials, 
see Complaint at 6–9, Nat’l Day Laborer Organizing Network v. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, No. 10-CV-3488 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/SC_Complaint_REAL_FINAL.pdf (critiquing the implementation and reliability of 
the Secure Communities program); and the large-scale use of preventive detention, see, 
e.g., Legomsky, supra note 28, at 489–94 (considering the accelerated use of preventative 
detention in immigration proceedings). 
188 Immigrants prevailed in four of the seven cases heard during this period.  There were no 
relevant criminal-type appeals during this period, and if we include the affirmative law-
suits related to deportation proceedings immigrants won 50% (4/8) of the time. 
189 This is compared with an approximately 40% victory rate for criminal defendants.  See, 
e.g., Criminal Justice and the 1997–98 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra note 177; Criminal Jus-
tice and the 1998–99 United States Supreme Court Term, supra note 177; Criminal Justice and the 
1999–2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, supra note 177; Criminal Justice and the 2000–2001 U.S. 
Supreme Court Term, supra note 177; Criminal Justice and the 2001–02 United States Supreme 
Court Term, supra note 177; Criminal Justice and the 2002–2003 United States Supreme Court 
Term, supra note 177; Criminal Justice and the 2003–2004 United States Supreme Court Term, 
supra note 177; Criminal Justice and the 2004–2005 United States Supreme Court Term, supra 
note 177. 
190 Immigrants prevailed in seven of the eleven cases heard during this period.  If we include 
the criminal-type appeals, this percentage raises to 69% (9/13), and there were no cases 
involving affirmative lawsuits related to deportation proceedings during this period. 
191 During the Roberts Court, defendants won 48 of 113 cases.  See Criminal Justice and the 
2005–2006 United States Supreme Court Term, supra note 177 (finding a defendant win rate 
of 43%); Criminal Justice and the 2006–2007 United States Supreme Court Term, supra note 177 
(finding a defendant win rate of 36%); Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007–
2008 Term, supra note 177 (finding a defendant win rate of 50%); Criminal Justice and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Term, supra note 177 (finding a defendant win rate of 
39%).  Data for the 2009 term is not yet available and thus has not been included. 
192 See sources cited supra note 169 (illustrating the Supreme Court’s drift towards more con-
servative views). 
193 There are, of course, other factors that could have contributed to immigrants’ rising for-
tunes, such as over-reaching in enforcement efforts and an increasingly well-organized 
immigration bar.  However, while this data alone does not tell a conclusive story, read to-
gether with the language in Padilla and the other indicia set forth below, see discussion in-
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viewed together with the Padilla decision, are significant additional 
evidence that the Court has grown uncomfortable with the asymme-
try that the civil label has created in deportation proceedings.194 
C. Public Perception Regarding the Link Between Criminal and Deportable 
Offenses 
The Supreme Court is sometimes referred to as an anti-
democratic institution.195  Indeed, some understand the primary pur-
pose of the Supreme Court as a check on the otherwise democratic 
nature of the government.196  Accordingly, it may seem counter-
intuitive to look at public perception as an indicia of where the Su-
preme Court is likely to go next.  However, recent scholarship ex-
amining the role of popular opinion on Supreme Court decision-
making has led some to conclude that over time the Supreme Court 
has gone from “being an institution intended to check the popular 
will to one that frequently confirms it.”197 
 
fra Part III.C, it gives us good reason to believe the Court has grown uncomfortable with 
the current state of affairs in deportation cases. 
194 Others have suggested that the Court’s tortured reasoning in some immigration cases or 
its stretching to import criminal norms, see discussion infra Part III.D, is further evidence 
of the Court’s discomfort with the current state of the doctrine.  See, e.g., Motomura, supra 
note 25, at 564–76 (offering a thorough explanation of how courts’ discomfort with their 
inability to apply standard constitutional scrutiny to removal cases has led them to use 
“phantom” constitutional norms to render purportedly subconstitutional decisions in fa-
vor of respondents); Slocum, supra note 91, at 522 (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
created the immigration rule of lenity to offset the Court’s extreme reluctance to consid-
er constitutional challenges to immigration statutes). 
195 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.”); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Con-
stitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (1998) (“These attacks on the legitimacy of 
judgment in a democracy have left their mark . . . on the public understanding of the 
judicial role and on the Supreme Court’s understanding of its own role.”); Barry Fried-
man, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:  Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 971, 972 (2000) (discussing the expectation that “the law operates in a world sepa-
rate and apart from that of politics” and “disdain [at] the notion of judges rendering de-
cisions under the threat of political retribution”). 
196 See BICKEL, supra note 195, at 16 (“Marshall . . . spoke of enforcing, on behalf of ‘the 
people,’ the limits that they have ordained for the institutions of a limited government.”); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question:  An Essay on Constitutional Scho-
larship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (1984) (discussing the contro-
versy over whether judicial activism is appropriate in a democratic society). 
197 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2009); See also LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 17 (1998) (arguing that in order to 
fully understand the choices Justices make, we must take into account the social context 
in which they operate); Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme 
Court:  Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 468 
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Indeed, as Professor Barry Friedman recently chronicled: 
Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment 
of the American people . . . . On issue after contentious issue . . . the Su-
preme Court has rendered decisions that . . . find support in the latest 
Gallop Poll . . . . The Court will get ahead of the American people on 
some issues . . . . On others . . . it will lag behind.  But over time . . . the 
Court and the public will come into basic alliance with each other.198 
This is so, Professor Friedman argues, because after President Roose-
velt’s plan to pack the Court and other pivotal episodes in the Court’s 
history, modern “[J]ustices recognize the fragility of their position” 
and thus “hew rather closely to the mainstream of popular judg-
ment.”199 
Accordingly, public perception regarding the civil or criminal na-
ture of deportation is at least one factor we should look to in consi-
dering the likelihood that the Court will move forward and solidify 
the Padilla conception of deportation.  Like Padilla, public percep-
tion increasingly and unambiguously conflates deportable offenses 
and crimes.  This is true on both sides of the ideological spectrum—
whether it is the liberal who is shocked to learn that detained immi-
grants do not receive appointed lawyers or the conservative talk show 
caller who declares all “illegal immigrants are criminals.”200  Indeed, 
 
(1997) (“[T]he Court’s decisions generally, but not invariably coincide with the public’s 
preferences.”); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive:  The Nature and Function of 
Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1273 (2004) (“The work of judges happens as 
much in the opinions as in the votes.”); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least 
Dangerous Branch Revisited:  New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 
66 J. POL. 1018, 1018 (2004) (“To [some], the Supreme Court’s dependence upon other 
institutions to give force to its rulings creates a need to remain attentive to the changing 
course of popular attitudes.” (citation omitted)); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, 
The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Su-
preme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 87–88 (1993) (outlining several scholars’ 
theories on Supreme Court decisions and popular will). 
198 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 197, at 14–15. 
199 Id. at 14. 
200 See, e.g., Jim Garrett, Illegal Immigrants Are Criminals, ASBURY PARK PRESS, July 22, 2010, (on 
file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (equating immigration 
violators and criminals); Illegal Immigrants Are Criminals, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 2010, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-19/news/chi-100319loeffler_briefs_1_
criminals-reign-alien (“I cannot find ‘undocumented’ in my dictionary.  This is [a] eu-
phemism for illegal alien.  In my dictionary illegal means criminal.”); Jaynee Germond, Il-
legal Means Criminal, JAYNEE GERMOND FOR US CONGRESS (Sept. 27, 2009), 
http://jayneegermondforcongress.blogspot.com/2009/09/illegal-means-criminal.html 
(“What is so difficult about the concept of illegal immigration[?]  Illegal means crimi-
nal . . . . Why aren’t these known criminals deported immediately?”); Illegal Immigration Is 
a Crime, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (Mar. 2005), http://www.fairus.org/site/
News2?page=NewsArticle&id=16663&security=1601&news_iv_ctrl=1007 (labeling “aliens 
who flagrantly violate our nation’s laws by unlawfully crossing U.S. borders and visa “over-
stayers” as “illegal immigrants” and noting that “[b]oth types of illegal immigrants are 
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Americans increasingly view undocumented immigrants in particular, 
and immigrants in general, as criminals.201  This is so even though de-
portation proceedings continue to enjoy the formal “civil label” and 
even though the great weight of empirical evidence demonstrates 
that immigrants are less prone to criminal activity than native-born 
populations.202  It is the immigration violations themselves that are 
perceived as criminal.  Accordingly, a decision by the Supreme Court 
explicitly holding that deportation proceedings are quasi-criminal, as 
Padilla suggests, would, in Professor Freidman’s words, bring “the 
Court and the public . . . into basic alliance with each other.”203 
D. The Opportunity to Make Sense of an Incoherent Doctrine 
A final reason to believe that the Court may now be ready to re-
think the nature of removal proceedings is that such reconceptualiza-
tion is the only way to rescue the modern immigration jurisprudence 
from its confused and indefensible current state.  As discussed supra 
Part 0, the rationale for the civil label—the “inherent powers 
theory”—has long ago been repudiated by the Court, and no alterna-
tive justification has been substituted.204  Meanwhile, uniquely crimi-
nal law doctrinal strands increasingly weave their way into these pur-
portedly “purely civil proceedings.”205  Only the principle of stare 
decisis remains to justify the civil label and, at some point, stare deci-
sis is not enough. 
The discussion in Padilla of the nature of deportation, viewed in 
contrast to past Supreme Court pronouncements and in the context 
 
deportable under [the] Immigration and Nationality Act Section 237(a)(1)(B)”).  See gen-
erally M. Kathleen Dingerman & Rubén G. Rumbaut, The Immigration-Crime Nexus and Post-
Deportation Experiences:  En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U. 
LA VERNE L. REV. 363, 367 (2010) (“[Immigrants] who are detained and deported from 
the United States are perceived as not only ‘undocumented laborers’ but ‘criminal 
aliens.’”). 
201 Legomsky, supra note 28, at 503–04 (“Although the vast bulk of immigration to the Unit-
ed States occurs through legal channels, the public thinks the opposite is true.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
202 RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT 
CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION:  INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE 
AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 3 (2007), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/Imm%20Criminality%20(IPC).pdf (“[In 2000] about three-fourths 
(73 percent) of Americans believed that immigration is causally related to more 
crime . . . . But this perception is not supported empirically . . . . [I]t is refuted by the 
preponderance of scientific evidence.  Both contemporary and historical data . . . have 
shown repeatedly that immigration actually is associated with lower crime rates.”). 
203 FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 197, at 15. 
204 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
205 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also discussion supra Part I.C. 
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of the other evidence of the Court’s increasing discomfort with the 
asymmetric criminalization of immigration law, and the public’s 
growing perception conflating the two realms, gives us good reason 
to believe that what we are seeing in Padilla is a turning point in the 
Court’s conception of deportation.  Padilla represents the first step, a 
significant step, toward a sea of change that will allow the Court to be 
explicit about what is already apparent from the case law:  deporta-
tion is neither purely civil nor is it purely criminal.  Deportation lies 
in the space between the two realms.  This understanding will help 
make sense of the partial incorporation of criminal doctrinal strands 
that we already have seen and, more importantly, will require the 
Court to grapple with the hard question of what other types of crimi-
nal protections should be afforded to respondents in deportation 
proceedings.  As this conception of “deportation as different” comes 
to prominence, no longer will courts be able to escape engaging the 
hard question by simple reference to the civil label.  Some criminal 
protections will apply and some will not, but it will take more than a 
citation to Fong Yue Ting to resolve the matter.  Below I offer an ana-
lytic framework to aid courts in making principled determinations of 
what criminal-type protections to apply under this new conception of 
deportation. 
IV.  HOW TO EVALUATE THE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS UNDER 
PADILLA’S CONCEPTION OF DEPORTATION 
Courts have a clear constitutional mechanism for evaluating the 
rights of criminal defendants206 and a well-developed line of cases to 
determine the rights of litigants in the civil contexts.207  One poten-
tially daunting obstacle to the full and explicit acceptance of Padilla’s 
new conception of deportation will be the lack of any recognized me-
chanism to evaluate the rights of respondents in proceedings that are 
neither civil nor criminal.  We can start from the premise that, consis-
tent with the conception of deportation as straddling the civil-
criminal divide, in some instances criminal-type protections will at-
tach and in some instances they will not.  I hope herein to begin a 
conversation in the scholarship aimed at aiding future judicial efforts 
to conceptualize a way forward.  Developing a complete framework to 
 
206 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
207 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 
213 (2005); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 
1, 4 (1991); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469 (1986); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
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evaluate the rights of respondents in quasi-criminal deportation pro-
ceedings will be a complex task and is beyond the scope of what can 
be achieved here.  Instead, I seek to lay out some basic principles that 
can be used to begin the discussion and support judicial efforts in the 
wake of Padilla. 
First it is important to recognize that, as a practical matter, there is 
ample precedent for selective incorporation of criminal rights into 
non-criminal proceedings.  Beyond the examples from the immigra-
tion realm already discussed,208 the Court has applied some rights 
commonly associated with criminal proceedings to non-criminal pro-
ceedings, including juvenile delinquency proceedings,209 parental 
termination proceedings,210 civil commitment proceedings,211 some 
parole revocation proceedings,212 and court martial proceedings.213  
Moreover, there is significant scholarly support for the Court’s sug-
gestion that deportation is quasi-criminal.214  But the fact that it has 
been done in the past and that scholars have validated the Court’s 
evolving conception of deportation does not resolve the central prob-
lem of how to decide which criminal protections apply and in what 
form. 
In order to develop a principled method of analysis it is useful to 
begin by investigating the contrasting nature of the criminal and civil 
methods for assessing rights.  In the civil realm, we have the intuitive-
ly appealing Mathews balancing test.215  It seems eminently logical to 
simply weigh 
 
208 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
209 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31, 61 (1967) (applying criminal protection against self incri-
mination to juvenile proceedings to determine delinquency). 
210 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (“When deprivation of parental status is at stake, 
however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is due.”). 
211 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (finding that a determination of appel-
lant’s mental illness and dangerousness to himself and others must be proven by more 
than the common civil preponderance of the evidence standard). 
212 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484–85, 488–89 (1972) (holding that petitioner facing 
civil parole revocation is entitled to some aspects of the traditionally criminal rights to 
venue in location of the arrest and violation, the right to speedy preliminary adjudication, 
and the right to confront a witness). 
213 See United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2222 (2009) (permitting a collateral attack 
based on the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to proceed where 
judgment of conviction was entered by a court-martial); see also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 
U.S. 25, 33 (1976) (noting that “[t]he question of whether an accused in a court-martial 
has a constitutional right to counsel has been much debated and never squarely resolved” 
and avoiding the ultimate constitutional question). 
214 See, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 28; Fragomen, supra note 27; Kanstroom, supra note 28; 
Pauw, supra note 28; Pinzon, supra note 28; Salinas, supra note 28; Torrey, supra note 28; 
Developments in the Law:  Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, supra note 28. 
215 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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three distinct factors:  First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.216 
In the criminal realm, of course, we generally use a different 
model to evaluate defendants’ rights.  In the criminal realm, the ap-
plicable rights operate, in most instances,217 as a hard floor that apply 
categorically to defendants regardless of the gravity of punishment, 
the cost to the state,218 or how important the right is to ensure a “cor-
rect” outcome in the given case.219  In a criminal case, for example, 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees the same hard floor right to ap-
pointed counsel to any indigent defendant subject to imprisonment, 
regardless of whether the potential term of imprisonment is one day 
or one hundred years.220  Every criminal defendant has the right to be 
tried in the venue in which the alleged crime occurred regardless of 
the convenience or inconvenience to the state.221  Even with judicially 
 
216 Id. 
217 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.  See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
357–58, 361 (1977) (holding that a sentencing judge cannot impose the death sentence 
on the basis of a confidential presentence report on the grounds that capital punishment 
is “different in kind” from other forms of criminal punishment); see also Scott v. Illinois, 
440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (establishing that the right to appointed counsel applies only if 
the sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment). 
218 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of 
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him . . . . Governments, both state and 
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants 
accused of crime . . . . That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who 
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread 
belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries . . . . From the very be-
ginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on proce-
dural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals 
in which every defendant stands equal before the law.  This noble ideal cannot be rea-
lized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist 
him.”). 
219 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
372 (1970); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); Josephine Ross, What’s Relia-
bility Got to Do with the Confrontation Clause After Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 389 
(2009).  See generally Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome:  The Proper Role of Corroborative 
Evidence in Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1097, 1100 (2003). 
220 Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (holding that “no indigent criminal defendant [may] be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense”). 
221 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
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created criminal rights, we generally see the same hard floor model 
being applied.  For example, any criminal defendant has the right to 
have their inculpatory statement suppressed if it was the product of 
custodial interrogation without Miranda warning, regardless of 
whether he or she faces minor misdemeanor or serious felony 
charges.222 
We must then understand the rationale behind the different ap-
proaches utilized in civil and criminal cases.  Why, for example, do we 
not simply dispense with the hard floor model altogether and eva-
luate the rights of criminal defendants using the Mathews balancing 
test?  Or put another way, in the context of deportation, maybe the 
problem is not the civil approach but rather that the courts have just 
done a bad job applying the Mathews test in deportation cases.  Maybe 
the courts have just underestimated the gravity of deportation and 
given too much weight to the potential cost to the state of greater 
protections.  Maybe the Supreme Court can just recalibrate the Ma-
thews balance.  Maybe, but I think not.  In fact, the Supreme Court 
has given extraordinary lip service to the gravity of deportation, call-
ing it “a savage penalty”223 and “‘the equivalent of banishment or ex-
ile’”224 that may result in the loss of “all that makes life worth living.”225  
I think there is something more fundamentally wrong with applying a 
balancing test to deportation, at least as the initial inquiry. 
The Constitution is, of course, the simple but unsatisfying answer 
as to why we use the hard floor model in the criminal realm.  It is un-
satisfying because it begs the question of why the Framers decided to 
utilize the hard floor model of rights in criminal proceedings.226  Why 
should a person accused of turnstile jumping, facing the prospect of 
a day in jail (or less), receive the same full panoply of rights as a per-
son accused of rape, facing years in prison?  The hard floor model is, 
at times, extremely inefficient insofar as it sometimes uses a sledge 
 
shall have been committed . . . .”); Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220–21 (1956) 
(“This requirement of venue states the public policy that fixes the situs of the trial in the 
vicinage of the crime . . . .”); United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 704–05 (1946) 
(“The constitutional specification is geographic; and the geography prescribed is the dis-
trict or districts within which the offense is committed.”). 
222 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
223 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
224 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 
U.S. 388, 390–391 (1947)). 
225 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
226 Moreover, even judicially created criminal rights tend to utilize the hard floor model ra-
ther than a sliding scale model or balancing.  See discussion supra notes 218–22 and ac-
companying text.  There are, admittedly, rare examples of hard floor civil rights as well.  
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII (granting a limited right to jury trial). 
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hammer of protections when a fly swatter would do.  The balancing 
test would allow a court to look at the individual circumstances, the 
gravity of the potential penalty, the risk of error in the case, and the 
cost of various protections to the state, and make a more refined in-
dividualized determination of what justice requires. 
But the Framers found such individualized determinations unac-
ceptable in the criminal context, and with good reason.  The reason 
can be found in the concept of rule utilitarianism.  The premise of 
rule utilitarianism is that in some instances we can maximize human 
well-being by application of static rules rather than through individu-
alized determinations.227  This can be so because bias can prevent us 
from making accurate calculations of the optimal course of action in 
individual cases228 or because we recognize there will always be, re-
gardless of bias, some error rate in our calculations, and the gravity of 
error in one direction is such that it is optimal to create a fixed rule 
skewed in favor of avoiding such grave errors.229 
These are precisely the dynamics at play that justify the hard floor 
model of rights in criminal law.  We are concerned that we cannot 
trust courts, on a regular basis, to strike an optimum balance because 
of two types of bias:  bias against politically disfavored criminal de-
fendants and bias in favor of criminal justice actors (prosecutors and 
police) who are regular collaborators with the court in the adminis-
tration of justice.230  Moreover, our system makes a very conscious de-
cision to skew the error rate in favor of wrongful acquittals, rather 
than wrongful convictions,231 in recognition of the gravity of the loss 
of physical liberty that can result in criminal cases and the severe so-
cial stigma associated with a criminal conviction.232 
 
227 R.M. HARE, ESSAYS ON POLITICAL MORALITY ch. 7–8 (1989); J.J.C. SMART, AN OUTLINE OF 
A SYSTEM OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS 42–57 (1972); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. 
REV., 3, 3–32. 
228 SMART, supra note 227, at 43; GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 162 (1971). 
229 Id. 
230 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979).  See generally Keith A. Findley & 
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 291 (2006); Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt:  How Changes in 
the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165 
(2003). 
231 It has been a familiar axiom of criminal justice since at least the time of Blackstone that it 
is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Har-
lan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man 
go free.”). 
232 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting “the opprobrium and stigma of a 
criminal conviction”); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 (1996) (referring to 
“the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction”); Scott v. Illinios, 440 U.S. 
June 2011] DEPORTATION IS DIFFERENT 1355 
 
Accordingly, when assessing whether (and how) a particular right 
should apply in the deportation context, I propose, a three-step me-
thod of inquiry.  “Step One” must be to determine whether the values 
a criminal right seeks to protect are at issue in comparable ways in 
the deportation context and thus whether the right applies at all in 
deportation proceedings.  “Step Two,” assuming the right applies, is 
to determine whether the right is to be applied in a category of de-
portation proceedings requiring criminal-style hard floor rights or a 
category where the civil-style balancing model is more appropriate.  
“Step Three” would be to determine the parameters of the right to be 
applied under whichever model is employed. 
Under “Step One,” there will be some criminal rights that simply 
do not warrant any application to the deportation context.  This in-
quiry will turn primarily on the nature of the right and its practical 
application to deportation proceedings.  For example, the right to a 
speedy trial is a core criminal right that serves to insure that criminal 
defendants are provided the opportunity to test the state’s evidence 
at trial before witnesses’ memories are faded and to ensure that the 
specter of a criminal charge, and the reputational harm associated 
with such a charge, does not hang indefinitely over the accused’s 
head.  In non-detained deportation proceedings, the respondents’ 
interest is almost always served by prolonging the removal proceed-
ings.  In deportation proceedings, the factual issues that require evi-
dentiary hearings often turn on the positive equities in a respon-
dent’s life, not on some particular events on the single day of an 
alleged offense, as in criminal proceedings.  More time before trial 
allows respondents to continue to develop positive equities such as 
work history, community involvement, educational achievement, fam-
ily ties, and so on.  Accordingly, the interests served by the speedy tri-
al right are simply not at play in the deportation proceedings for non-
detained respondents and thus do not apply.  You can imagine a simi-
larly odd fit between the right to grand jury indictment and deporta-
tion and thus we would expect that this right, too, simply would not 
apply. 
Most criminal rights, however, will have some relevant application 
to some deportation proceedings, and thus the critical inquiry will be 
“Step Two”:  to determine whether the right is to be applied in a cat-
egory of deportation proceedings requiring a criminal hard floor 
 
367, 372–73 (1979) (affirming that “incarceration [i]s so severe a sanction that it should 
not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant ha[s] been of-
fered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States impli-
cit in such a rule”). 
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model or the civil balancing model.  Unlike “Step One,” this deter-
mination will, in most instances, turn on the nature of the respon-
dent or the nature of the proceedings, not the nature of the right.  
The court would have to determine whether the factors that justify a 
hard floor—(1) bias against a politically disfavored group; (2) bias in 
favor of state enforcement actors who are regular collaborators with 
the court in the administration of justice; (3) gravity of potential loss 
of liberty; and (4) gravity of social stigma associated with a negative 
outcome in the proceedings—are present in degrees comparable to 
criminal proceedings.  If they are, courts should utilize the hard floor 
model because we can expect a static rule to ultimately maximize 
human well-being.233  If they are not, courts can resort to traditional 
civil balancing analysis, because we can expect an individualized de-
termination to more likely produce, on whole, desirable outcomes. 
Some of these factors will be consistent across all deportation pro-
ceedings.  For example, all noncitizens are disenfranchised and sub-
ject to some level of social animus in modern America.234  Likewise, 
we would expect to see a relatively consistent institutional bias of 
courts, particularly immigration courts, in favor of their fellow actors 
in the immigration enforcement scheme.  Moreover, any deportation 
will involve a significant restraint on liberty—the forced relocation 
beyond our national boundary.  However, these baseline commonali-
ties, I would propose, are not alone sufficient to trigger bias and dis-
proportionate harm sufficient to make all deportation proceedings 
analogous to criminal proceedings such as to justify consistent appli-
cation of hard floor rules.  Imagine, for example, an individual who 
enters the United States as a business traveler from an economically 
strong visa-waiver country and a week later receives a notice that he is 
to appear for a deportation hearing because some technical defect 
 
233 Though the floor may not be identical to the floor in criminal proceedings.  See infra 
notes 242–45 and accompanying text. 
234 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 161–62 (1980) (“Aliens cannot vote in any 
state, which means that any representation they receive will be exclusively ‘virtual.’  That 
fact should at the very least require an unusually strong showing of a favorable environ-
ment for empathy, something that is lacking here.  Hostility toward ‘foreigners’ is a time-
honored American tradition.  Moreover, our legislatures are composed almost entirely of 
citizens who have always been such.  Neither, finally, is the exaggerated stereotyping to 
which that situation lends itself ameliorated by any substantial degree of social inter-
course between recent immigrants and those who make the laws.”); Kevin R. Johnson, A 
Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” Giant:  The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o 
and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1264–66 (“Noncitizens barred from 
formal political participation are especially vulnerable to the whims of the majori-
ty . . . . Today’s immigrants . . . suffer disfavor in the political process not only because of 
their immigration status, but also because of their race.”). 
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was discovered with his entry documents, and he is forced thereby to 
cut his business trip short.  It would be hard to characterize such a 
respondent as politically disfavored in any significant way.  A short-
ened business trip is hardly a liberty deprivation comparable to crim-
inal incarceration, and it is doubtful that significant stigma would at-
tach to this scenario, here or in the visitor’s home country. 
But in other circumstances, the nature of the respondent or the 
nature of the proceedings could well alter the analysis in ways that 
would require application of a hard floor model.  Take Padilla him-
self as an example.  In regard to the nature of the respondent, Padilla 
was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over forty 
years, a veteran of the United States Army, and lived with his family in 
the United States.  It is not difficult to conceive of how such factors 
change the analysis regarding the gravity of the liberty interest at 
stake in the deportation proceedings.  In regard to the nature of the 
proceedings, Padilla was subject to mandatory detention, forced to 
fight his case while incarcerated, and the sole charge against him was 
the result of a criminal conviction.  So, for Padilla, in addition to ul-
timate deportation, we see a physical deprivation of liberty equivalent 
to criminal incarceration,235 a stigma both here and in Honduras re-
lated to criminal deportees that equals and may even surpass the 
stigma associated with many criminal convictions,236 and membership 
in a group that garners almost unrivaled political disfavor—“criminal 
aliens.”237  Thus, in many ways Padilla presented the easiest scenario 
 
235 SCHRIRO, supra note 10, at 4 (“As a matter of law, Immigration Detention is unlike Crimi-
nal Incarceration.  Yet Immigration Detention and Criminal Incarceration detainees tend 
to be seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations are typically ma-
naged in similar ways.  Each group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities with har-
dened perimeters in remote locations at considerable distances from counsel and/or 
their communities.  With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens 
were originally built, and currently operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and 
sentenced felons.  Their design, construction, staffing plans, and population manage-
ment strategies are based largely upon the principles of command and control.  Likewise, 
ICE adopted standards that are based upon corrections law and promulgated by correc-
tional organizations to guide the operation of jails and prisons.”). 
236 See Markowitz, supra note 7, at 351 (“[T]here is already significant social stigma associated 
with being deported and immigrants facing deportation are among the most politically 
marginalized groups in American society.”). 
237 ICE aggressively promotes the specter of “criminal aliens” as a nationwide threat to com-
munity safety through press releases and marketing materials.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 87 Convicted Criminal Aliens and Fugitives Ar-
rested in ICE Enforcement Surges, (July 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1007/100728richmond.htm; U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities Brochure (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf (“ICE is improving 
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to argue in favor of application of criminal style protections—a long 
term legal permanent resident (“LPR”), with U.S. citizen family, fac-
ing detained removal proceedings and automatic deportation as a di-
rect result of a criminal conviction.  The Padilla Court’s analysis 
seems to place particular weight on the nexus between the criminal 
conviction and the deportation proceedings.238  I have suggested 
elsewhere that the status of the respondent as a lawful permanent res-
ident should be the overriding factor.239  Others have suggested that 
detention is the critical issue.240  Which of these, or other characteris-
tics, would alone be sufficient to justify a rule utilitarian approach, or 
which combination is necessary, is a difficult question I do not seek to 
resolve here. 
Assuming, however, that we have a right that applies (“Step One”) 
and a type of proceeding and/or respondent that justifies application 
of a hard floor rule (“Step Two”), “Step Three” is to determine pre-
cisely the rule to be applied.241  When civil-type balancing is appropri-
ate, traditional Mathews analysis will suffice.  For hard floor rights, this 
will require courts to make categorical determinations regarding the 
nature and scope of the right which will create optimal results across 
the class of respondents or proceedings to which it applies.242  We 
should not assume that the rule will operate in precisely the same 
way, with the same hard floor, as in criminal proceedings. 
Take for example, the right to appointed counsel—the criminal 
right most coveted by immigrants in removal proceedings.  If the cat-
egory to which the hard floor is being applied is respondents facing 
criminal removal charges, one could well argue that counsel should 
be appointed to all indigent respondents just as it is in criminal pro-
ceedings, for reasons discussed below.  However, if the hard floor is 
 
public safety by working to better identify, detain and ultimately remove dangerous crim-
inal aliens from your community.”). 
238 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“[D]eportation is nevertheless intimate-
ly related to the criminal process.”). 
239 Markowitz, supra note 7, at 315 (“[T]he most important critiques of the inherent powers 
theory are those driven by an analysis based upon . . . the special status of permanent res-
idents.”). 
240 Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 138–49 (2008). 
241 Of course, if “Step Two” dictates that a balancing model should be employed then courts 
would revert to traditional Mathews analysis. 
242 Some may view this categorical determination as just a balancing exercise of another type.  
Indeed, even when hard floor rights are utilized, some balancing will be required in de-
fining the scope of that right.  However, having such balancing occur for broad classes of 
respondents on an appellate level specifically guided by the factors set forth in step two—
potential bias and the gravity of the liberty interest—will better insure appropriate pro-
tections than leaving trial level courts to make individualized Mathews-type judgments. 
June 2011] DEPORTATION IS DIFFERENT 1359 
 
being applied instead to all detained immigrants, one could imagine 
the Court defining a different scope of right to appointed counsel in 
order to obtain that optimum balance of outcomes across all pro-
ceedings.  Removal proceedings generally require immigration 
judges to potentially make three determinations:  (1) is a respondent 
removable as charged; (2) is the respondent eligible for relief; and 
(3) does the respondent warrant relief as a matter of discretion.  In 
the case of people facing removal charges based on criminal charges, 
the first two issues often involve extraordinarily complicated legal is-
sues regarding the way federal immigration law maps onto the crimi-
nal code of a given state.  Accordingly, on balance, if you are going to 
apply a right to appointed counsel, it makes good sense to do so at 
the outset of the proceeding for people with criminal removal 
charges. 
The large majority of non-criminal deportation proceedings, 
however, involve much simpler deportability determinations:  wheth-
er someone entered the country illegally or whether they have stayed 
beyond the period authorized upon admission.243  For many respon-
dents facing such charges, the truth is that there is little that an at-
torney would be able to do to aid them in their case.  If they over-
stayed their visa and are ineligible for relief, in the large majority of 
cases, it is unlikely an attorney would be able to alter the outcome of 
a proceeding.  If, however, a court deems them prima facie eligible 
for some form of relief, the success rates of applicants on applications 
for relief vary dramatically depending on whether they are or are not 
represented.244  Accordingly, it may be that in non-criminal removal 
cases the hard floor right to appointed counsel applies only to res-
pondents who are prima facie eligible for relief.  In the alternative, 
because of the high percentage of deportation proceedings in which 
the outcome would not be altered by appointed counsel,245 perhaps 
 
243 See Individuals Charged in Immigration Court with Only Immigration Violations FY 1992–2006, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/178/include/only_immigration_charges.html (last visited May 11, 2011) (indi-
cating that nearly 65% of all individuals charged with removal for immigration violations 
were charged with entry without inspection). 
244 See, e.g., Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal:  A Survey of 
Alternate Practices, in STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 232 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/legalAssist.pdf.  The 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom found that in expedited 
removal cases, where many of the applicants are in detention, unrepresented respondents 
succeeded only 2% of the time, while those with counsel succeeded 25% of the time.  Id. 
at 239. 
245 This is an attribute that distinguishes deportation proceedings from criminal proceed-
ings.  Since the vast majority of criminal proceedings are resolved through plea bargain-
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the Court would define the scope of the right as:  the right to be 
screened for appointment by an impartial entity to determine wheth-
er there is a legal issue or factual hearing likely, which would warrant 
appointment of counsel in a given case.  I do not mean to suggest 
that any of these are the optimal or likely outcome.  I only intend to 
demonstrate how, even if the Court determines it should apply a hard 
floor model, we cannot assume the right will operate in precisely the 
same way as in criminal proceedings. 
This three step inquiry—(1) Does the right apply meaningfully in 
deportation proceedings? (2) Does the nature of the proceedings 
and the respondent warrant a hard floor model? and (3) What is the 
scope of the hard floor right to be applied?—is a mechanism by 
which courts can begin to make principled determination under the 
Padilla conception of deportation regarding which criminal rights 
should apply in deportation proceeding and how to apply them. 
CONCLUSION 
We stand at the doorstep of a significant, even radical, reconcep-
tualization of the nature of deportation, and Padilla is the foot in that 
door.  Commentators have been knocking for decades, decrying the 
incoherent state of the current conception of deportation as purely 
civil and arguing against the formalist reasoning that has denied im-
migrants a level of procedural protection commensurate with the 
gravity of deportation proceedings.246  Whether the Court will ulti-
mately step through the door and overrule Fong Yue Ting and whole-
 
ing, attorneys add significant value—because of their expertise in plea negotiation—even 
in those cases where no substantive legal issues or factual hearings are likely.  In contrast, 
deportation proceedings are rarely resolved through plea agreement.  But cf. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(d) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall provide by regulation for the entry by an 
immigration judge of an order of removal stipulated to by the alien (or the alien’s repre-
sentative) . . . [which] shall constitute a conclusive determination of the alien’s remova-
bility from the United States.”); Jayashri Srikantiah & Karen Tumlin, Nat’l Immigration 
Law Ctr., Backgrounder:  Stipulated Removal, available at http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/removpsds/stipulated-removal-bkgrndr-2008-11.pdf (discussing “due 
process concerns about the use of the stipulated removal program [and] the program’s 
staggering expansion over the past five years”); Legomsky, supra note 28, at 494–95 (dis-
cussing how “[c]riminal-style plea bargaining has seeped into” immigration law in situa-
tions where “[p]olice and prosecutors grant permission to remain at least temporarily in 
the United States rather than initiate removal proceedings, in exchange for the willing-
ness of a minor player to cooperate in securing the convictions of those who played more 
major roles” and also in the asylum context, through “a growing practice among some 
immigration judges to offer applicants withholding of removal in exchange for withdraw-
ing their applications for asylum”). 
246 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
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heartedly adopt the Padilla conception of deportation as straddling 
the civil-criminal divide is, of course, impossible to predict. 
The stakes could not be higher for immigrants facing deportation, 
including, for example, the right to appointed counsel, the protec-
tions against disproportionate punishment, assurance that the rules 
of the game cannot be changed retroactively, and an end to the regu-
lar practice of detaining immigrants for their deportation proceed-
ings in remote locations thousands of miles away from their homes in 
the United States.  By every objective measure, deportation has never 
before been such a pervasive feature of American society and never 
before been so connected to the criminal process.247  As the laws tar-
geting immigrants for deportation grow harsher by the year and as 
criminal and immigration law continue to become ever more entan-
gled, the dissonance with civil label has reached a crescendo.  Until 
Padilla, there was little reason to be hopeful that the Court was ready 
to address the growing incoherence.  Padilla gives us reason to hope. 
 
247 Julia Preston, Administration Spares Students in Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8 2010, at A1, 
A12 (noting that the Obama administration deported a record 389,834 people in fiscal 
year 2009 and has deported a record 142,526 immigrants convicted of crimes in the be-
tween October 2009 and August 2010).  ICE’s budget for fiscal year 2010 was $5.7 billion, 
which represents a 60% increase in funding since fiscal year 2005.  Compare ICE Budget 
Fact Sheet:  Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/#Chief Financial Officer-Management and 
Budget (last visited May 11, 2011), with ICE Budget Fact Sheet:  Fiscal Year 2005, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
library/factsheets/pdf/2005budgetfactsheet.pdf.  ICE’s  detention capacity has ballooned 
from 7500 beds in 1995 to over 30,000 today, see SCHRIRO, supra note 10, at 2, and for the 
first time in U.S. history, a full 50% of respondents in deportation proceedings were de-
tained in fiscal year 2009, up from under 30% just four years ago.  EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK fig. 23 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf. 
